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Preface 
 
The phenomenology of severe accidents of nuclear power plants (NPP) is very 
complex. The improved understanding of them is a result of the benefit from 
research and development activities in severe accident phenomenology. Owing 
to the state-of-the-art understanding and increased characterisation of NPP 
severe accidents, overall management of them could be – and also should be - 
analysed as an integrated complex process. The interrelationship of NPP 
emergency operating procedures, safety and risk assessments, severe accident 
management guidelines, and emergency off-site actions should be planned and 
organized to minimize the consequences of such accidents. A deterministic 
approach, coupled with both probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) technology 
and PSA results can play significant roles in the development of relevant nuclear 
utility, regulatory and all stakeholders’ policies.  
This report describes the background, objectives and current state of a 
corresponding activity within JRC-IE's Analysis and Management of Nuclear 
Accidents (AMA) Action on probabilistic safety / risk assessment methodologies 
and practices for risk-informed decision making approach (RIDM) applied to NPP 
emergency zoning within FP7. It provides a systematic overview and generic 
framework of the essential aspects of RIDM in NPP emergency zoning as a 
contribution to possible future harmonisation of strategic planning practices in 
this area. The issue is challenging, because this approach is interdisciplinary by 
nature, based on integration of PSA technology, severe accident 
phenomenology, and radiological protection.  
This activity is expected to complement - in terms of probabilistic aspects - 
current JRC-IE activities on traditional deterministic safety / risk assessment of 
NPPs.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
At the Institute for Energy (IE) of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
European Commission (EC), Petten, The Netherlands, an activity on  
probabilistic safety / risk assessment methodologies and their applications is in 
progress within the framework of the JRC FP7 Action Nr. 52101 "Analysis and 
Management of Nuclear Accidents" (AMA).  
The objective of this activity is to contribute to the common, state-of-the-art 
understanding of the methodologies and their applications in order to improve the 
confidence in them, and to help decrease unnecessary conservatism for more 
effective ensuring the continued safety of nuclear power plants (NPP).  
Level 2 (L2) and level 3 (L3) of the current, advanced PSA technology and their 
results can, in principle, be used to estimate the offsite consequences of beyond 
design basis accidents (BDBA) and severe accidents of NPP. They could provide 
an acceptable basis for implementation of risk informed support in decision 
making (RIDM) processes, related to NPP emergency planning measures, 
especially to defining emergency zones round NPPs.  
Considerable experience has been gained during the past years regarding 
severe accident risk assessment and mitigation, mainly in the USA. Prediction of 
environmental impacts of severe accidents (in the form of probability-weighted 
consequences) was performed for all NPPs and the risk reduction potential was 
identified using severe accident mitigation alternatives. These activities are 
usually performed mainly within the license renewal process of the plants. In 
addition, the future risk is calculated for the extended lifetimes.  
Based on the information obtained during the first stage of the project within FP6, 
several significant differences have been found in the definitions of emergency 
planning zones (EPZ) of the NPPs in different countries within the EU and 
beyond. The current approach to emergency planning is, in general, traditionally 
deterministic, when usually a reference accident is defined to be used as a basis 
for drawing up corresponding emergency plans.  
This report provides a supplement to the report EUR 21580 EN [1], produced by 
JRC-IE in 2005 on this subject, and aimed at benchmarking and harmonising 
strategic planning practices for NPP emergency zoning. In EU Member States, 
the practical application of L2 PSA results for the emergency management has 
been limited and, in fact, little risk based information has been used. In the 
course of that project, only the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the UK informed 
that L2 PSA results were used in some way as an input to emergency 
arrangements. The UK is the only EU Member State, which investigated how L2 
PSA outcomes could be used in a systematic way for emergency planning 
purposes. 
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Since then, more L2 PSA studies have been initiated, completed or updated, for 
the variety of NPP designs being in exploitation in EU Member States. Besides, 
now there is a better understanding of complex severe accident phenomena and 
their modelling. The improved understanding is a result of the benefit from 
research and development activities in severe accident phenomenology.  
This report describes the background, the objectives and current state of the 
corresponding JRC-IE activities in the field of probabilistic safety / risk 
assessment methodologies and practices with emphasis on the RIDM approach 
applied to NPP emergency zoning. This approach is interdisciplinary; it is based 
on integration of PSA technology, severe accident phenomenology, and 
radiological protection. It provides a systematic overview of the essential aspects 
of RIDM in NPP emergency zoning and contributes to the possible future 
harmonisation of strategic planning practices in this area. Owing to the current, 
advanced level of PSA technology, which is already mature enough, state-of-the-
art understanding and increased characterisation of NPP severe accidents, 
overall management of them could be - and should be - analysed as an 
integrated complex process. The interrelationship of NPP emergency operating 
procedures, safety and risk assessments, severe accident management 
guidelines, and emergency off-site actions should be planned and organised to 
minimize the consequences of such accidents. A traditional deterministic 
approach, coupled with both PSA technology and PSA results, can play 
significant role in the development of relevant utility, regulatory and all 
stakeholders’ policies.  
The benefits from this project are:  
1) A better understanding of important issues in PSA technology applications 
to risk informed supporting of NPP emergency zoning in relation to 
emergency management,  
2) A better knowledge on the actual use of various current approaches and 
methods in the area, and  
3) Information on the efforts undertaken by utilities, regulatory authorities and 
other stakeholders to explore possibilities and means of using probabilistic 
approaches for this topic.  
The overall aim of this report is to establish a generic framework towards 
possible future harmonisation of NPP emergency planning practices in EU 
Member States. The resulting knowledge should help regulatory authorities, civil 
protection institutions, European institutions such as EC services, and various 
PSA users and developers to get a clear picture on the relevance of the issue, 
the consistency of current approaches and on related research and development 
needs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Emergency planning zones (EPZs) around a NPP are, in general, defined on a 
deterministic basis. They help to elaborate a strategy for protective actions during 
an emergency. The exact size and shape of each EPZ is a result of detailed 
analysis, which includes consideration of geographical features and demographic 
information specific at each site. 
Predetermined protective action plans are set up for EPZs; they are designed to 
avoid or reduce doses from potential ingestion of radioactive materials. These 
actions include sheltering, evacuation, and use of stabile iodine-isotope tablets in 
the short term (first two weeks after the severe accident); then food bans, 
population relocation and decontamination in the longer term.  
There are various differences in EU Member States in the way how emergency 
plans have been drawn up and how EPZs have been defined. Usually simplified 
deterministic approaches are used.  
Based on the state-of-the-art developments and achievements in application of 
PSA technology, the original hypothesis that initiated this project is that PSA 
technology is currently already mature enough to support defining NPP 
emergency zones based on risk informed decision making approach. This 
resulted in the long term objective of this JRC project to agree - together with the 
developers and owners of this information - on a harmonised “template” to 
publish corresponding results to different stakeholders, (including the public), at a 
European level.  
This report provides a supplement to the report EUR 21580 EN [1], produced by 
JRC-IE in 2005 on the same subject, and aimed at benchmarking and 
harmonising strategic planning practices for NPP emergency zoning. Since then, 
there have been more probabilistic safety assessment studies of level 2 (L2 PSA) 
developed, completed, updated, and elaborated in EU Member States for variety 
of NPP designs. Besides, there is now a better understanding of severe accident 
phenomena and modelling, which is extremely complex. The improved 
understanding of them is a result of the benefit from research and development 
activities in severe accident phenomenology.  
Owing to the state-of-the-art understanding and increased characterisation of 
NPP severe accidents, there would be a better chance of using L2 and L3 PSA 
results for risk informed support of decision making (RIDM) in NPP emergency 
zoning. A traditional deterministic approach, coupled with both advanced, 
matured PSA technology and PSA results can play significant role in the 
development of relevant nuclear utility, regulatory and all stakeholders’ policies. 
The overall aim of this report is to establish a generic framework towards 
possible future harmonising of NPP emergency planning practices in EU Member 
States. 
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2. BACKROUND AND RELEVANCE OF THE ISSUE 
The 1995-2000 activity programs of the Nuclear Regulators Working Group 
(NRWG) and the Reactor Safety Working Group (RSWG) of the EC were carried 
out within the framework of the 1975 and 1992 resolutions of the Council of 
Ministers on the technological problems of nuclear safety 1. 
The 1975 resolution called for ”... progressive harmonisation of safety 
requirements and criteria in order to provide for an equivalent and satisfactory 
degree of protection of the population and of the environment against the risk of 
radiation resulting from nuclear activities …” The 1995 Consensus Document on 
the safety of European Light Water Reactors (LWR) noted that ”... harmonisation 
begins with the identification of convergences and the assessment of 
divergences based on synthesis studies resulting from an intensive exchange of 
information of the actual practices in the different Member States”.  
In 1993, the EC established a contract with a Consortium of European Technical 
Support Organisations (TSOs) in order to arrive at common views on technical 
safety issues related to large evolutionary Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) in 
Europe, which could be ready for operation during the next decades. The TSOs 
involved were: AVN (Belgium) (Technical project leader), former AEA 
Technology (United Kingdom), ANPA (Italy), CIEMAT (Spain), GRS (Germany) 
and IPSN (France). The general objective of the European TSO Study Project on 
Development of a Common Safety Approach in the EU for Large Evolutionary 
Pressurised Water Reactors [2] was to develop, through a collaboration of EU 
TSOs, a common safety approach to issues related to large evolutionary PWRs 
in Europe. The TSO study represented an important step forward in the 
development of a common approach of the TSOs to the safety of advanced 
evolutionary PWRs. This goal was mainly achieved by an in-depth analysis of the 
key safety issues, taking into account new developments in the national 
technical safety objectives.  
After careful considerations, and on the basis of the survey of advanced PWR 
concepts in preparation for the consolidated analysis, a list of 12 key issues was 
finally prepared and selected for in-depth analysis. These selected key issues, 
listed below (those key issues of the list, which are in close relation to the report 
in hand, are printed in bold), were judged to have the greatest safety 
significance: 
• Use of PSA in design and licensing; 
• Reduced environmental source term and emergency plan; 
                                                 
1
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/nuclear/safety/index_en.htm 
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• Identification of postulated initiating events (PIEs) and associated 
acceptance criteria; 
• Instrumentation and control systems important for safety (hardware and 
software aspects); 
• System architecture; 
• Passive systems behaviour; 
• Practical elimination of core melt in shutdown states with open 
containment; 
• Practical elimination of high pressure core melt; 
• Practical elimination of core melt with containment bypass; 
• Practical elimination of large early releases resulting from 
containment failure; 
• Mitigation of low pressure core melt and vessel melt-through; 
• Identification of severe accidents: methodology and acceptance criteria.  
For all the key issues considered in the European TSO Study, conclusions have 
been developed covering the state of knowledge, safety approaches, and the 
approaches taken in selected reactor designs. In addition, TSO group positions 
have been formulated regarding the development of a common approach for 
each key safety issue, highlighting any studies still to be done in order to reach 
the required common understanding and consensus. These common positions 
formed the major achievement of the TSO study project. Areas in which further 
work was felt to be needed include: 
• PSA methods and use; 
• In-containment source term and radiological releases; 
• Application of the Single Failure Criterion (SFC) and maintenance; 
consideration; 
• Reliability of passive systems; 
• Containment by-pass; 
• Hydrogen risk, no occurrence of deflagration to detonation transition; 
• Strategies for corium coolability; 
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• Demonstration of practical elimination of selected sequences; 
• Qualification of systems for severe accidents.  
In summary, an important step forward has been made in the development of a 
common safety approach of the TSOs. This was mainly achieved by an in-depth 
analysis of the key safety issues. The above lists of key issues and of areas for 
further work clearly indicate that risk informed support of emergency zoning for 
NPPs and potential future harmonisation of strategic planning practices are of 
high relevance.  
A further argument for moving towards more risk informed approaches comes 
from the common practices in another high-risk industrial sector, the chemical 
process industry: Although in the process industry the probabilistic approach to 
risk assessment is certainly less complete and consistent as compared to the 
nuclear industry, risk informed results are nevertheless used in many countries 
for land use planning (risk / emergency zoning) purposes. Land use planning is a 
legal requirement in the EU under the so-called Seveso II Directive ("Directive 
96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards")2 and risk informed methods 
are encouraged in the practical implementation of the Directive.  
Owing to the state-of-the-art understanding and increased characterisation of 
NPP severe accidents as well as advanced understanding of PSA technology, 
overall management of NPP severe accidents could be – and also should be - 
analysed as an integrated complex process. The interrelationship of NPP 
emergency operating procedures, safety and risk assessments, severe accident 
management guidelines, and emergency off-site actions should be planned and 
organized to minimize the consequences of such accidents. This approach might 
be a contribution to ensure the continued safety of NPPs and to improve 
effectiveness of regulatory practices in EU Member States.  
 
                                                 
2
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/seveso/index.htm 
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3. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT 
The current approach to NPP emergency planning is, in general, traditionally 
deterministic, when usually a reference accident is defined to be used as a basis 
for drawing up corresponding emergency plans.  
On the other hand, Level 2 (L2) and level 3 (L3) of the current, advanced PSA 
technology and their results can, in principle, be used to estimate the offsite 
consequences of beyond design basis accidents (BDBA) and severe accidents of 
NPP. They could provide an acceptable basis for implementation of risk informed 
support in decision making (RIDM) processes, related to NPP emergency 
planning measures, especially to defining emergency zones round NPPs.  
This report provides a supplement to the report EUR 21580 EN [1], produced by 
JRC-IE in 2005 on this subject, and aimed at benchmarking and harmonising 
strategic planning practices for NPP emergency zoning. In EU Member States, 
the practical application of L2 PSA results for the emergency management has 
been limited and, in fact, little risk based information has been used. In the 
course of that project, only the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the UK informed 
about some cases where L2 PSA results were used in a way as an input to 
emergency arrangements. The UK is the only Member State of the EU, which 
has been carrying out research to consider how L2 PSA outcomes could be used 
in a systematic way for emergency planning purposes. 
The general objective of this project is to contribute to the common, state-of the-
art understanding of the methodologies and their applications in order to improve 
the confidence in them, and to help decrease unnecessary conservatism for 
more effective ensuring the continued safety of NPPs. 
The more detailed objectives are:  
• To provide a systematic overview and generic framework of the relevant  
aspects of risk informed decision making (RIDM) in NPP emergency 
zoning as a contribution to possible future harmonisation of strategic 
planning practices in this area, based on integration of essentials of PSA 
technology, severe accident phenomenology, and radiological protection.  
• To document the current status together with some concrete and specific 
examples of NPP risk informed emergency zoning practice.  
• To complement - in terms of probabilistic aspects - current JRC-IE 
activities on traditional deterministic safety / risk assessment of NPPs.  
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4. EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES AND MEASURES  
4.1 IAEA Reference Documents Basic Information 
 
This section provides a brief summary of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) guidance on emergency planning zones, actions and intervention criteria. 
The information has been extracted from IAEA document EPR-METHOD 2003 
[3] and IAEA Safety Standards Series GS-R-2 [4]. This provides an international 
perspective on the pertinent issues related to the emergency zoning (EZ) 
requirements. 
The IAEA Requirements [4], jointly sponsored by Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), IAEA, International Labour 
Organization (ILO), OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO), United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and World Health Organization (WHO) are 
specified for five threat categories. For the purpose of this report, threat category 
I is relevant: it applies to facilities, such as Nuclear Power Plants (NPP), for 
which on-site events, including very low probability events are postulated that 
could give rise to severe deterministic effects3 off the site, or for which such 
events have occurred in similar facilities. The on-site events involve an 
atmospheric or liquid release of radioactive material or external exposure that 
originates from a site location. 
 
The IAEA document [4] establishes numerous requirements related to generic 
areas: on the site (on-site) and off the site (off-site). In addition, the document [4] 
establishes requirements for two off-site emergency zones: the precautionary 
action zone (PAZ) and urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ) [5]. Facilities 
in threat category I and II (facilities in threat category II are such as some type of 
research reactors) warrant extensive on and off-site emergency preparedness 
arrangements. In addition, threat category V is considered further, as it applies 
for activities not normally involving sources of ionizing radiation, but which yield 
products with a significant likelihood of becoming contaminated as a result of 
events at facilities in threat category I (or II), including such facilities in 
neighbouring countries. 
 
On-site area 
This is the area under control of the operator or the first responder4. It is 
surrounding the facility within the security perimeter, fence, which is under 
                                                 
3
 Doses in excess of those for which intervention is expected to be undertaken under any 
circumstances. Deterministic effect is a health effect of radiation for which generally a threshold 
level of dose exists above which the severity of the effect is greater for a higher dose. Such an 
effect is described as a ‘severe deterministic effect’ if it is fatal or life threatening or results in a 
permanent injury that reduces quality of life [3, 4, 5]. 
4
 The first members of an emergency service to respond at the scene of an emergency [3, 4, 5]. 
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immediate control of the facility operator. 
 
Off-site area 
This is the area beyond that which is under the control of the facility operator or 
first responders. 
 
The document [4] requires that for facilities in threat category I or II, 
arrangements shall be made for effectively making and implementing decisions 
on urgent protective actions to be taken off the site within: 
 
(a) a PAZ, for facilities in threat category I, within which arrangements shall 
be made with the goal of taking precautionary urgent protective action, 
before a release of radioactive material occurs or shortly after a release of 
radioactive material begins, on the basis of conditions at the facility (such 
as the emergency classification) in order to reduce substantially the risk of 
severe deterministic effects. 
 
(b) an UPZ, for facilities in threat category I or II, within which arrangements 
shall be made for urgent protective action to be taken promptly, in 
 
On-Site: Internal zone, under control of NPP operator 
PAZ: Precautionary Action Zone 
UPZ: Urgent Protective action planning Zone 
LPZ: Long-term Protective Zone (Food Restriction Planning Zone-FRPZ) 
 
Fig. 4.1. NPP Emergency planning zones. 
 
NPP 
On-Site 
 PAZ 
      UPZ 
      LPZ 
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accordance either with international or national standards, in order to avert dose 
off the site.  
 
The PAZ and UPZ should be roughly circular areas around the facility, their 
boundaries should be defined, where appropriate, by local landmarks (e.g. roads 
or rivers) to allow easy identification during a response as illustrated in Fig. 4.1. It 
is important to note that the zones should not stop at national borders. The size 
of the PAZ and the UPZ should be consistent with the guidance provided in 
Appendix II of [5]. 
 
In addition to PAZ and UPZ, there is also a Food Restriction Planning Zone 
(FRPZ), which is more often called Longer-term Protective action Zone (LPZ). 
This is an area around the facility where preparations for effective 
implementation of protective actions to reduce the long term dose, i.e. the risk of 
stochastic health effects5 from deposition and ingestion of locally grown food, 
should be developed in advance. The longer term protective action zone will of 
course include the PAZ and the UPZ and extend to a further radius. On the 
bases of severe accident studies, the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (USNRC) for instance has adopted this zone of 80 km (50 miles), 
however, it might be much larger, up to a couple of hundreds of kilometres.  
 
4.2 Emergency Planning Measures 
Concerning urgent protective action, it is the “action in the event of an emergency 
which must be taken promptly (normally within hours) in order to be effective, and 
the effectiveness of which will be markedly reduced if it is delayed. The most 
commonly considered urgent protective actions in nuclear or radiological 
emergency are evacuation, decontamination of individuals, sheltering, respiratory 
protection, iodine prophylaxis and restriction of the consumption of potentially 
contaminated foodstuffs” [4]. The urgent protective actions are, effectively, the 
radiological exposure protective options, which represent the consequence 
mitigation part. The main options, i. e emergency planning (EP) actions for 
preventing and limiting exposures are generally known as following:  
Evacuation. The best strategy for preventing serious exposures, if feasible, is to 
evacuate people from the area before the radioactive materials arrive.  
Sheltering. Placing barriers between the radioactive materials and people is 
effective for some releases. The most commonly available and suitable barrier is 
a building, the walls and roof of which attenuate to some extent the gamma 
radiation. The heavier the construction, the more effective the shielding; 
                                                 
5 A radiation induced health effect, the probability of occurrence of which is greater for a higher 
radiation dose and the severity of which (if it occurs) is independent of dose. Stochastic effects 
may be somatic effects or hereditary effects, and generally occur without a threshold level of 
dose. Examples include thyroid cancer and leukaemia [3, 4, 5]  
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basements are particularly advantageous locations.  
Respiratory protection. Breathing through any of a variety of materials – 
facemasks, tissues, towels, or other cloth – offers significant protection against 
the inhalation of particles.  
Relocation. If large amounts of radioactivity persist in the area, sheltering is not 
a sufficient protective measure, and people must be moved from the area until it 
is decontaminated.  
Potassium iodide (KI) prophylaxis. Iodine uptake by the body can be blocked 
by the ingestion of stable iodine prior to, or immediately after, exposure. If taken 
properly, potassium iodide will help reduce the dose of radiation to the thyroid 
gland from radioactive iodine, and reduce the risk of thyroid cancer.  
Decontamination of people. Apart from removing people from the vicinity of 
radioactivity or using barriers, it is, in some situations, desirable to remove 
radioactive materials from the immediate vicinity of people. Decontamination 
includes removing contaminated clothing and washing off external contamination.  
Decontamination of land and buildings. This is not generally considered an 
emergency response; however, it is important to remember that the significant 
off-site economic costs of a major accident will be for attempted decontamination 
and for property that is unusable because it cannot be sufficiently 
decontaminated.  
Protection of the food chain. Ingestion of contaminated food and water can 
account for nearly half of the aggregate population’s exposure to radioactivity. 
Food-chain interventions are thus crucial to emergency response efforts directed 
toward delayed health effects.  
 
Medical treatment. Finally, there is a need for medical efforts to alleviate 
consequences. Medical care entails screening and follow-up capabilities and the 
possibility of deploying a significant medical infrastructure. 
 
The most recent document IAEA [5] from Feb. 2005 specifies more precisely the 
urgent protective actions and countermeasures should include the following: 
• isolation of a contaminated area or radioactive source and prevention of 
inadvertent ingestion; 
• evacuation; 
• sheltering; 
• respiratory protection and protection of skin and eyes; 
• decontamination of individuals; 
• stable iodine prophylaxis; 
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• protection of the food supply and prevention of the consumption of 
significantly contaminated foodstuffs and water; 
• managing the medical response; 
• protection of international trade6. 
It should be mentioned, that in some countries including the following ones 
mentioned further, term “emergency planning zone (EPZ)” is often used instead 
of the above term UPZ. The differences in basic terminology have historical 
reasons, since the traditional terms were usually based on USNRC NUREG 
documents, particularly essential NUREG-0654 Criteria for Preparation and 
Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in 
Support of Nuclear Power Plants (1980) [6], which is still in force. Effective EP 
measures have to be based on a comprehensive threat assessment, which 
considers the most likely accidents, as well as also addressing less probable 
(including the least likely) but more severe (including the most severe) accidents. 
The level of EP measures has also to reflect the health risk, which takes into 
account both the possible consequences of accidents and their likelihood as well. 
 
4.2.1 Emergency Planning Measures in Some Countries 
EP measures can be defined as the measures, which enable individuals, bodies 
and authorities to organise rapid and effective emergency responses. Protective 
actions against nuclear emergencies cover measures to limit the exposure of the  
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Exposure rate against time and some EP essentials. 
 
                                                 
6 This item is not relevant to this report and is mentioned here only due to completeness 
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public to radioactive contamination through external exposure, inhalation, and 
ingestion. The objectives of these measures are to prevent deterministic effects, 
i.e. early mortality, and to reduce stochastic effects, e.g. thyroid cancer and 
leukaemia. Figure 4.2 plots exposure rate against time and covers some 
essentials on emergency planning. This provides an overview of the EP basic 
terminology and which protective actions against release of radioactive materials 
are appropriate at which stage of a severe accident7 [10]. 
 
The following definitions of the emergency planning zones (EPZ) (roughly circular 
with specified radius) are given in some particular countries; this is updated 
information given in [1, 7]:  
Belgium: The general EPZs are associated with the following protective actions: 
evacuation (10 km), sheltering (10 km), stable iodine intake (20 km) and food 
chain (whole country). The size of these zones has been defined taking into 
account a rough (presumably largely deterministic) estimation of the associated 
risks.  
China: The zones as follows are applied for NPP Tianwan (PWR): internal zone 
3-5 km, outer zone 7-10 km and ingestion exposure pathway zone 20 km [8]. 
Czech Republic: The predetermined evacuation of people is performed within 5 
km internal zone around Temelín NPP and within 10 km internal zone around 
Dukovany NPP. The emergency planning zone is a territory of 20 km around 
Dukovany NPP and 13 km around Temelín NPP. The predetermined actions are 
sheltering and taking iodine tablets. The difference between the EPZ for Temelín 
NPP and for Dukovany NPP is due to different population densities, 
meteorological and evacuation conditions.  
Finland: Rescue service plan (by rescue service authorities) for emergency 
preparedness zone (20 km); advance iodine pellets and quick actions (sheltering, 
evacuation) for 5 km zone.  
France: Around each NPP there are two zones defined. The emergency 
planning zone of 5 km radius around a nuclear power plant is the zone where 
evacuation is pre-planned and prepared in detail. The emergency planning zone 
of 10 km radius around a NPP is the zone where sheltering is pre-planned. 
Stable iodine tablets have been previously distributed in France to the population 
within a radius of 10 km around a NPP. The emergency planning zones of 5 km 
and 10 km radii around a NPP provide reasonable assurance that the doses to 
the population in the short term would be below the different intervention levels8 
for a spectrum of accidents and radionuclide releases, in particular for most core 
melt accidents. Another important consideration is that 5 and 10 km are 
                                                 
7
 An accident that involves extensive core damage and fission product release into the reactor 
vessel and containment, with potential release to the environment [28]. 
8
 The level of avertable dose at which a specific protective action is taken in an emergency or a 
situation of chronic exposure [3, 4, 5]. 
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practicable distances for planning in France. It is also recognized that protective 
actions could be extended beyond 10 km if conditions warrant. Much more time 
would be available for emergency response beyond these distances. Concerning 
intervention levels, sheltering is recommended when the projected effective dose 
exceeds 10 mSv, whereas evacuation is recommended when this dose exceeds 
50 mSv. The intake of stable iodine is recommended when the thyroid committed 
equivalent dose by inhalation exceeds 100 mSv for most sensitive population [9].  
Hungary: There are three planning zones: the smallest in radius of 3 km is the 
“precautionary protective action-planning zone” in which the measures are 
introduced without delay. This zone is surrounded by 30 km circle within which 
the “urgent protective action planning zone” can be found; and then the largest 
zone of 80 km is located. That is the “long term protective action planning zone”. 
Concerning the latter two zones, specific laws determine the intervention levels.  
Japan: The EPZ is about 8 to 10 km for the facilities of commercial plants and 
research reactors with power levels greater than 50 MWt. The standard of EPZ is 
the zone whose boundary (distance from the nuclear facilities) is defined so as to 
keep less than the lower limit of radiation exposure at the boundary, 10 mSv to 
whole body dose and 100 mSv to thyroid with sufficient margins supposing 
hypothetical accidents that cannot happen technically. Outside this range, there 
is no necessity of emergency actions such as sheltering and evacuation.  
The Netherlands: The various zones for direct measures are defined 
geographically as follows: 1) Evacuation zone circle with a radius of 5 km, 2) 
Iodine prophylaxis circle with a radius of 10 km, 3) Sheltering zone: circle with a 
radius of 20 km. The measures in cases of nuclear emergencies are coordinated 
at the national level.  
Slovakia: The EPZ is defined in relation to the maximum size of any radiation 
emergency that can be reasonably foreseen. The hazard area represents a circle 
with the centre in the nuclear facility and radius 30 km for Bohunice site, and 20 
km for Mochovce site. In case that the boundary demarcating the hazard area 
interferes with an inhabited area, the whole inhabited area is considered as a 
hazard area. The difference in the EPZ for Bohunice NPP and Mochovce NPP is 
due to different population density, meteorology and evacuation conditions.  
South Africa: In an effort to develop effective emergency plans, the utility 
(Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Eskom Generation) implemented a programme 
to derive the risk to the public and to use these risk insights to aid the 
optimisation of the emergency planning actions, zones and response times. The 
emergency plans are based on a comprehensive threat assessment which takes 
into account the most likely accidents while also addressing the less probable but 
more severe events. The level of emergency preparedness also reflects the 
health risk, which considers both possible consequences of accidents and their 
likelihood. International guidance as IAEA documents [3, 4] were followed in 
developing the emergency response requirements [10]. Internal zone of 5 km 
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and outer zone of 16 km have been established on the basis of severe accidents 
reference scenarios analyses. 
Spain: The definition is included in the Basic Nuclear Emergency Plan and it is 
common to all NPPs. These zones are predefined in function of the distance at 
the nuclear site (concentric zones) and of the wind direction (sector zones). The 
required different actions depend on each zone and the emergency situation. 
This is related to the emergency category, established in the Internal Emergency 
Plan and according to the Final Safety Assessment Report.  
Switzerland: Current zoning around NPP consists of an inner zone of 3-5 km, 
where a dose > 1 Sv is possible, and outer zone of 20 km where there is no 
acute threatening of life. Since 1998 there are legal provisions in force, requiring 
protection of the public for expected doses > 1mSv. Selection of scenarios for 
emergency planning have been based on both deterministic as well as 
probabilistic approach [11].  
UK: For each nuclear licensed site in the UK there is a defined zone round the 
site – the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) within which the 
arrangements to protect the public are planned in detail. The boundary of this 
zone is defined in relation to the maximum size of any radiation emergency that 
can be reasonably foreseen and ranges from 1 to 5 km. It is also recognised that 
radiation emergencies could occur that would have consequences beyond the 
DEPZ. The nature of the response required is more difficult to predict and will 
depend on a number of factors such as the characteristics of the release that has 
occurred and the prevailing weather conditions. To deal with this, there is a 
requirement that the emergency plans incorporate arrangements for 
“extendibility” beyond the DEPZ.  
USA: To facilitate a preplanned strategy for protective actions during an 
emergency, there are two EPZs around each NPP. First, the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ has a radius of about 10 miles (16 km) from the reactor. 
Predetermined protection actions include sheltering, evacuation, and the use of 
potassium iodide where appropriate. Second, the ingestion exposure pathway 
EPZ. It has a radius of about 50 miles (80 km) from the reactor. Predetermined 
protection actions include a ban of contaminated food and water.  
 
4.3 Suggested Emergency Planning Zones and Radius Sizes  
For threat category I, i. e. for NPPs, IAEA document [3] in its Appendix 5 
provides suggestions for the approximate radius of the EP zones and food 
restriction planning radius as given in the following Table 4.1. The radii were 
selected based on calculations performed using RASCAL 3.0 computer code9 
                                                 
9
 
RASCAL 3.0, Description of Model and Methods, NUREG-1741, USNRC, Washington DC, 2001. 
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[12]. The calculations assumed average meteorological conditions, no rain, 
ground level release; 48 hours of exposure to ground shine, and calculates the 
centralized dose to a person outside for 48 hours. The suggested sizes for the 
PAZ were based on expert judgment considering the following: 
 
Facilities PAZ radius UPZ radius FRPZ radius 
Reactors > 1000MW (th) 3 – 5 km 25 km 300 km 
Reactors > 100 - 1000MW (th) 0.5 -3 km 5 – 25 km 50 - 300 km 
 
Table 4.1. Suggested Emergency Zones and Radius Sizes for NPPs. 
 
(1) Urgent protective actions taken before or shortly after a release within this 
radius will prevent doses above the early death thresholds for the vast majority of 
severe emergencies postulated for these facilities. 
 
(2) Urgent protective actions taken before or shortly after a release within this 
radius will avert doses above the urgent protective action generic intervention 
level10 (GIL) for the majority of emergencies postulated for the facility. 
(3) Dose rates that could have been fatal within a few hours were observed at 
these distances during the Chernobyl accident. 
(4) The maximum reasonable radius for the PAZ is assumed to be 5 km 
because:  
a) except for the most severe emergencies, it is the limit to which early 
deaths are postulated [13];  
b) it provides about a factor of ten reduction in dose compared to the dose on 
the site;  
c) it is very unlikely that urgent protective actions will be warranted at a 
significant distance beyond this radial distance;  
d) it is considered the practical limit of the distance to which substantial 
sheltering or evacuation can be promptly implemented before or shortly 
after a release; and  
e) implementing precautionary urgent protective actions to a larger radius 
may reduce the effectiveness of the action for the people near the site, 
                                                 
10 The level of avertable dose at which a specific protective action is taken in an emergency or 
situation of chronic exposure  
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who are at the greatest risk. 
 
The suggested sizes for the UPZ are also based on expert judgment considering 
the following: 
  
(1) These are the radial distances to which the reference NUREG-1150 [13] 
suggests that monitoring to locate and evacuate hot spots (deposition) within 
hours/days may be warranted in order to significantly reduce the risk of early 
deaths for the worst emergencies postulated for power reactors. 
(2) At these radial distances there is a factor of approximately 10 reduction in 
concentration (and thus risk) from a release compared to the concentration at the 
PAZ boundary. 
(3) This distance provides a substantial base for expansion of response efforts. 
(4) 25 km is assumed to be the practical limit for the radial distance within which 
to conduct monitoring and implement appropriate urgent protective actions within 
a few hours or days. Attempting to conduct initial monitoring to a larger radius 
may reduce the effectiveness of the protective actions for the people near the 
site, who are at the greatest risk. 
(5) For average meteorological (dilution) conditions, beyond this radius, for most 
postulated severe emergencies, the total effective dose for an individual would 
not exceed the urgent protective action GILs for evacuation. 
As far as long term protective zone FRPZ is concerned, in general, protective 
actions such as relocation, food restriction and agricultural countermeasures are 
based on expert judgement considering the following: 
(1) Detectable excess stochastic effects (cancers) are very unlikely beyond this 
distance. 
(2) Detailed planning within this distance provides a substantial basis for 
expansion of response efforts. 
(3) Food restrictions were warranted to about 300 km following the Chernobyl 
accident in order to prevent detectable excess thyroid cancers among children 
[3].  
It should be mentioned here so called Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 
that is an assessment of the likely influence a project may have on the 
environment. EIA is a procedure that ensures that the environmental implications 
of decisions are taken into account before the decisions are made and can be 
very briefly mentioned as the process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and 
mitigating the biophysical, social, and other relevant effects of development 
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proposals prior to major decisions being taken and commitments made. The 
purpose of the assessment is to ensure that decision-makers consider 
environmental impacts before deciding whether to proceed with new projects. 
 
The EIA directive11 (Directive 2001/42/EC) was first introduced in 1985 and was 
amended in 1997 and 2003. However, it has little practical relevance to the issue, 
as there is no background technical guideline or similar on how to evaluate zones 
in an EU-wide manner. Nevertheless, the issue of zoning is more and more 
mentioned in some current EIA studies for NPPs under operation, e.g. Temelin in 
Czech Republic, Mochovce in Slovakia, or under construction (Belene in 
Bulgaria).  
                                                 
11
 It requires EU Member States to achieve a particular result without dictating the means of 
achieving that result. 
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5. SOME WAYS OF DEFINING NPP EZ 
 5.1 Background considerations 
The main characteristics of NPP accidents are some general features of 
accidents, i. e. Design Basis Accidents12 (DBA), Beyond Design Basis 
Accidents13 (BDBA), severe accidents (SA), fission product characteristics, 
meteorological considerations, exposure pathways, adverse health effects, and 
avoiding adverse health effects. Overall considerations of them then result in 
essential concerns: (1) the sources of radiation from postulated accidents, (2) the 
potential pathways of radiation to the environment, and (3) the possible health 
effects of exposure to such accidental releases [14].  
 
Frequency  
of occurrence 
[1/reactor year] 
     
   Terminology used 
   
  Acceptance criteria 
10-2 – 1 
Expected in the life of the 
plant 
Anticipated Operational 
Occurrence 
No additional fuel damage 
10-4 – 10-2 
Chance greater than 1% 
over the life of the plant 
DBA No radiological impact at all 
or no radiological impact 
outside exclusion area 
10-6 – 10-4 
Chance lower than 1% over 
the life of the plant 
BDBA Radiological consequence 
outside exclusion area 
within limits 
< 10-6 
Very unlikely to occur 
Severe accidents Emergency response 
needed 
Table 5.1. Grouping of NPP event occurrences. 
Grouping of NPP events including accidents by frequency of their occurrence 
differs in different countries. One of the possible subdivisions is given in Table 
                                                 
12
 DBA: plant design covers them and plant engineered safety features will cope with them.  
13
 BDBA: plant design does not cover them and plant engineered safety features would not cope 
with them. 
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5.1 [15, 16]. The probabilistic values given in the table are illustrative. They are to 
be considered more qualitatively than quantitatively [16].  
Usually, there is a close interrelation between probability of occurrence and 
acceptance criteria of the results of safety analysis. BDBAs and severe accidents 
are typically treated separately in accident analysis, although some initiating 
events are the same. The results help to determine measures to prevent severe 
accidents and to mitigate the radiological consequences. Accident management 
and emergency response measures are necessary if all the barriers against 
radioactive releases are significantly degraded in a BDBA. For severe accidents, 
containment and/or confinement typically remains as the only barrier to limit 
accidental releases. The measures to restore and maintain the safety functions 
under such conditions include the use of: 
• Alternative, or diverse systems, procedures and methods (e.g. in-vessel 
melt retention), including the use of non-safety-grade equipment; 
• External equipment for temporary replacement of a standard component; 
• Off-site emergency measures (limitations on food consumption, sheltering 
and evacuation). 
The internationally accepted common approach to radiological consequences of 
nuclear accidents is that the recommendations given in International Commission 
on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication No. 63 "Principles for Intervention 
for Protection of the Public in a Radiological Emergency" [17] and the IAEA 
Safety Series No. 115 "International Basic Safety Standards for Protection 
against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources" [18] can be 
regarded as widely agreed references concerning the initiation of protective 
actions. The ICRP recommendations provide relatively high intervention levels 
for the "nearly always justified” protective actions (e.g. 50 mSv for sheltering, 500 
mSv for evacuation), while it provides a rather wide range of values for the so-
called "optimised values" (50-500 mSv for evacuation). The above cited IAEA 
document [18] provides relatively low "generic optimised intervention levels" (for 
example 10 mSv of avertable dose for sheltering for a period of no more than 2 
days, 50 mSv of avertable dose for evacuation for a period of no more than 1 
week). These levels may be lowered or increased based on local conditions as, 
for example, population density, adequate transportation, weather conditions, 
etc. It seems to be consensus that new NPPs should be designed in a way taking 
into account the ICRP document [17] as well as other relevant documents, such 
as the IAEA standard document [18] and, besides, of course the well known As 
Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) approach. 
In general, there are three basic ways of defining NPP EPZs, based on 
probabilistic criteria in sense of probabilistic targets, or use of NPP PSA results. 
The essential basis for NPP EPZ considerations is a source term - the fractions 
defining the portion of the radionuclide inventory in the nuclear reactor at the start 
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of an accident that is released to the environment. The initial elevation, i.e. 
height, energy, and timing of the release are also included in the source term. 
More generally, a source term is a specific type of release characteristic of a 
reactor family and a representative of a type of accident, i.e. in general, a mode 
of containment failure following complete core meltdown [19]. It is taken into 
consideration to define appropriate corrective actions for the protection of 
populations under these extreme emergency conditions. 
Basically, there are three source terms as follows in decreasing order of 
seriousness and covering, by definition, a certain number of possible scenarios: 
• Source term ST1 corresponds to early containment failure a few hours 
after onset of the accident; 
• Source term ST2 corresponds to direct release to the atmosphere 
following loss of containment integrity one or several days after accident 
initiation; 
• Source term ST3 corresponds to indirect, delayed release to the 
atmosphere, through paths enabling a certain amount of fission products 
to be retained. 
The Reactor Safety Study (RSS) under the references WASH -1400 and NUREG 
75-014 as the first example of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), or 
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), giving figures for the probable accident 
impact on the population, is still the basis of NPP severe accident studies. The 
containment failure mode classification as in WASH 1400 is still used and 
comprises six main modes: 
• α: steam explosion in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) or reactor pit, 
including loss of containment integrity in the short term; 
• β: initial, or fast-induced lack of integrity; 
• γ: hydrogen explosion; 
• δ: slow overpressurization; 
• ε: basemat melt-through by the corium; 
•  V: bypass the containment using outgoing pipes (this mode does not 
directly concern the behaviour of the containment). 
Modes α, β, and γ without prevention and mitigation provisions could lead to ST1 
type release, mode δ could lead to ST2 type release and mode ε could lead to 
ST3 type release [19]. 
The publication of the WASH - 1400 as a first major PSA technology application, 
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subsequent conducted NPP PSA studies in the USA and later on definitive, 
comprehensive “compendium” NUREG 1150 [13] reference document on 
guidance for all PSA users had a tremendous impact on the thinking of nuclear 
safety experts. Two major insights from WASH-1400 were [20]:  
• Prior thinking was that (no quantified) frequency of severe core damage 
was extremely low and the consequences of such damage would be 
catastrophic. The WASH 1400 calculated a core damage frequency (CDF) 
in the order of 10-4 to 10-5 per reactor-year, a much higher number than 
anticipated, and showed that the consequences would not always be 
catastrophic.  
• A significant failure path for radioactivity release that bypasses the 
containment building was identified. Traditional safety analysis methods 
had failed to do so.  
However, unlike the RSS, most core melts are not expected to result in large off-
site consequences. The small fraction of accidents that might lead to large off-
site consequences generally involve either an early failure of the containment in 
relation to the time of core melt, or, a containment bypass. For other containment 
response modes, the retention properties of the containment are substantial. 
Analyses have shown that both natural and engineered retention mechanisms 
can significantly reduce the inventory of radionuclides available for release if 
enough time is available for those mechanisms to act. Therefore, source terms 
are strongly affected by whether or not the containment fails, and, if it fails, by the 
time and mode of the failure. The following global insights about off-site 
consequences have also been identified [21]: 
• Estimated risks of the early fatalities and injuries are very sensitive to 
source term magnitudes, the timing of releases and assumptions about 
the effectiveness of emergency plans; 
• Estimates of early health effects differ greatly from one site to another, but 
site to site differences are substantially less for latent cancers; 
• Airborne pathways are much more important than liquid pathways.  
 
5.2 The Use of Reference Source Term 
The establishment of emergency planning zones requires the definition of 
technical basis, in particular the choice of reference source terms. They are 
defined based on a deterministic approach. The use of reference source term 
and the follow-up framework for defining NPP EPZs is practised in e. g. France 
[9], to some extent also in the Netherlands.  
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The emergency plans must be able to respond effectively to accidents liable to 
occur at a NPP. This implies the definition of technical bases, i.e. the adoption of 
one or more accident scenarios encompassing the possible consequences, with 
a view to determining the nature and extent of the remedial means required. This 
task is difficult, since cases of real significant accidents are extremely rare, with 
the result being that a conservative theoretical approach is usually adopted to 
estimate the source terms (i.e. the quantities of radioactive materials released), 
calculate dispersion in the environment and finally assess the radiological impact. 
The possibility of severe accidents with reactor core meltdown, as the result of 
the combination of more or less complex failures cannot be fully excluded and it 
is the duty of the administration to prepare off-site emergency plans, specific to 
each nuclear installation, for the protection of the neighbouring population under 
such very unlikely, but serious circumstances. Since the Three Mile Island (TMI) 
and Chernobyl accidents numerous studies have been conducted to have a 
better knowledge of the risks and consequences of severe accidents on a light 
water reactor (LWR). Determining the timing, quantity and composition of the 
radionuclide mixture that might be released from the reactor core and from the 
containment is generally considered the most difficult aspect of determining 
potential offsite consequences of the accident. It is clear that the potential 
releases are strongly dependent on accident conditions and that those conditions 
cannot be delineated accurately in advance. 
The reference source terms in France are defined according to a deterministic 
approach [9]. Concerning the consequences of severe BDBAs, they can be 
assessed according to the behaviour of the containment after reactor core 
meltdown. The containment is one of the most important barriers in protecting the 
public. There have been increasing efforts for almost 40 years to determine NPP 
severe accident risks on a plant-specific basis. The first comprehensive plant-
specific examination of risk was the above mentioned RSS WASH-1400. The risk 
values calculated in RSS were later updated in NUREG-0773 The Development 
of Severe Reactor Accident Source Terms: 1957-1981 and used in USNRC final 
environmental impact statement, published after 1980, as well as in the Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants 
(NUREG-1437) [14]. Later, more complex and more intensive plant-specific risk 
studies were developed, both by USNRC and the industry. The most important 
USNRC studies of severe accident consequences are found in the NUREG-1150 
analyses [13], as already mentioned. 
On the basis of the adaptation of the above documents to the French NPP units, 
three general classes of severe accidents with core meltdown were distinguished 
as a basis for designing the French severe accident policy and making 
operational decisions [9]: 
• Accidents resulting in “early” failure of the containment, represented by 
source term ST1. 
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• Accidents resulting in “delayed” failure of the containment, at least 24 
hours after the beginning of the accident, without filtration of the 
corresponding releases. These accidents are represented by source term 
ST2. 
• Accidents resulting in “delayed” failure of the containment, at least 24 
hours after the beginning of the accident, with releases in a way ensuring 
some filtration. These accidents are represented by source term ST3. 
The three basic classes of source terms are summarized in Table 5.2 as 
percentages of the radioactive inventory released from the reactor core.  
In all cases, the consequences of the releases are dominated in the short term 
by iodine and in the long term by caesium. Furthermore, there is, in orders of 
magnitude, a factor of roughly 10 between source terms ST1 and ST2 and a 
factor of 10 between source terms ST2 and ST3. As a comparison, the 
Chernobyl accident releases, which amounted of 20 to 50 % of iodines and 
caesiums, are close to the ST1 source term.  
 
Source term ST1 ST2 ST3 
Noble gases 80 75 75 
Organic iodine 0.6 0.55 0.55 
Inorganic iodine 60 2.7 0.3 
Caesium 40 5.5 0.35 
Strontium 5 0.6 0.04 
Table 5.2. Basic classes of source term [%]. 
The source term ST1, resulting from a total and “early” failure of the containment, 
could result from phenomena like steam explosion or hydrogen detonation. It is 
considered that such failure of the containment can be excluded due to the 
characteristics of the large drywell containment used in France. The accidents 
corresponding to source term ST1 are considered as improbable. 
Other improvements have been brought to French nuclear power units with a 
view to reducing ST2 type releases to ST3 type releases as in, for example, the 
implementation of an “ultimate” procedure to improve the containment function, 
including the possibility of releases through a sand bed filter completed by a 
metallic pre-filter [9].  
These evaluations explain why source term ST3 was finally adopted as the 
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“maximum conceivable release” for French nuclear power units in operation or 
under construction. It must be clearly understood that the source term ST3 does 
not correspond to a particular scenario but is a reasonable envelope of the 
releases of various scenarios. It covers a set of possible scenarios and is not 
related to a precise accident scenario [9]. 
The source term ST3 is used as a technical basis for emergency plans for 
protection of the civil population, for determining the response of the utility and 
the public authorities concerned. The source term consequence assessment has 
a direct impact on the establishment of EP zones, protective actions, resources, 
procedures and the requirements for a preparedness organization. Emergency 
plans in France are designed to cope, as far as possible, with the consequences 
of a ST3 type release. 
The radiological consequences of a ST3 type release and their evolution in time 
were assessed for both the adult and the one-year-old child, in the vicinity of the 
NPP (from 1 to 20 kilometres). For calculation of the atmospheric dispersion and 
deposition of the radioactive substances, the Doury atmospheric diffusion 
model14 was used, with the hypothesis of a 5 m.s-1 wind velocity, normal diffusion 
conditions and absence of rainfall. These atmospheric conditions are average 
conditions for the French nuclear power plants. 
 
Nuclide groups Noble gases Iodine Caesium / 
Strontium 
Tellurium 
Total activity 
released (Bq) 
~ 5 x 1018 ~ 8 x 1016 ~ 2.5 x 1015 ~ 1.5 x 1016 
Table 5.3. Total activity released within 48 hours for 900 MW(e) PWR NPP. 
Table 5.3 presents the total activity expected to be released for the source term 
ST3 for a 900 MW(e) PWR unit used in France [9]. 
The results of the ST3 source term consequences calculations were compared to 
the intervention levels recommended in France by the Ministry of Health, to 
determine to which distance the respective countermeasures should be 
prepared. Respecting the recommended intervention levels implies the possibility 
of evacuating the population within a radius of 5 kilometres and of confining the 
population indoors within a radius of 10 kilometres around the NPP within less 
than 24 hours, which is in accordance with what is planned in emergency plans. 
The doses assessment also showed that evacuation of the population within a 
                                                 
14
 E.g. Thielen, H., Martens, R., Schnadt, H., Maßmeyer, K.: Further development of the French-
German dispersion model - SODAR pre-processor. International Journal of Environment and 
Pollution (IJEP), Vol. 14, No. 1/2/3/4/5/6, 2000. 
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radius of 2 kilometres around the NPP must not be delayed in the case of a ST3 
type release, which reinforced the interest of the creation of a respond action 
stage in off-site emergency plans. 
The thyroid committed equivalent dose is the most restrictive equivalent dose. 
The ST3 consequences could result in the decision, to be taken within 12 to 24 
hours, to organise absorption of stable iodine within a radius of 10 kilometres and 
in the decision to be taken before 48 hours, to organise absorption of stable 
iodine within a radius of less than 20 kilometres from the plant. This result 
reinforced the decision taken in France to create stable iodine stocks in each 
particular region. 
Despite a number of uncertainties in dose calculations (uncertainties on 
behaviour of the aerosols in the containment atmosphere, on atmospheric 
transport, on meteorological conditions…), the assessment of the short term 
consequences of a ST3 type release has allowed to check that the prepared 
provisions in emergency plans should be able to respond to accidents liable to 
occur at a NPP, even to low probability core-melt accidents [9].  
The second basic way of defining NPP EPZ is the use of European Utility 
Requirements Group original method for defining criteria for limited impact in 
case of severe accident.  
 
5.3 The Use of EUR Group Severe Accident Limited Impact 
Approach 
The European Utility Requirements (EUR) Group was created in the early 
nineties by a small group of European Utilities participating in the US Advanced 
Light Water Reactor Program (ALWR). The objective of the group was to build 
upon the experience gained in the ALWR program to issue a set of requirements, 
in particular safety relevant ones, common to all members, in order to facilitate 
interaction with national Safety Authorities and allow standardized designs to be 
built in all participating countries. Safety relevant requirements, though reflecting 
a common analysis and understanding of some safety issues, were never 
contemplated as substitutes to national Safety Authority requirements [22]. 
One of the prerequisites identified for reaching this objective was to increase 
public confidence in nuclear. Excellent performance of current NPP fleets in all 
EU Member States was deemed a key element for increased support by the 
public, and best European practice in the field of design, operation and 
maintenance were adequately reflected in some  EUR documents.  
However, in particular in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, it was felt that 
demonstrating that the design of future plants to be built in Europe would more 
explicitly address issues related to severe accidents and their consequences 
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than currently operating plants was likely to further increase acceptance of new 
nuclear units in Europe. Criteria for limited impact in case of severe accidents 
were defined, and special attention was devoted to issuing requirements related 
to containment capability for all situations contemplated for plant design.  
Further to these requirements, a methodology was developed to demonstrate 
compliance with the above mentioned objectives. This methodology was 
translated in very simple requirements allowing both vendors and utilities to 
assess whether the containment system, as designed, had adequate capability. 
From a utility standpoint, this approach also had the advantage of providing 
significant flexibility in discussions with Safety Authorities on adequate public 
protection, as neither a specific site or meteorology, nor a specific reactor output, 
are addressed at the requirement level [22]. 
This approach, or philosophy concerns also one aspect of the conclusions of the 
EC DG JRC-IE/OECD NEA International Seminar on Emergency & Risk Zoning 
around NPPs, held in 2005 in Petten, Netherlands. One of the conclusions of the 
seminar was, that further considerations need to be given on how emergency 
planning and the EP zones would be defined for future NPPs, where the risk 
from the plant in terms of large off-site releases of radioactivity would be very 
much lower than for the current plants. This needs to be reconciled with the 
expectations of the Regulatory Authorities and the public. Consideration needs to 
be given on whether the moral obligation to provide an emergency plan would 
outweigh the technical conclusion that this would not be required. The trend is, of 
course, to improve the level of safety for future NPPs. This would significantly 
reduce the potential for severe accidents and releases of radioactive material 
from the plant to occur. In principle, this could be considered to significantly 
reduce, or perhaps eliminate, the need for emergency planning [23, 24].  
Four goals have been defined to substantiate the notion of limited impact in case 
of severe accidents [22]: 
1. No emergency protection action is needed beyond the site boundary, i.e. 
beyond 800m from the reactor. This means that the averted Effective 
Committed Dose (ECD)15 over a period of one week (7 days) following 
accident initiation, will remain below 50 mSv, which is the generic 
intervention value reported in ICRP No. 63 [17] and which was adopted in 
the IAEA Basic Safety Standards No. 115 [18]. Practically speaking, 
evacuation and sheltering of people are not needed for such low values. 
2. No delayed action is needed beyond 3 km from the reactor. This means 
that the averted ECD over a period of thirty consecutive days following 
                                                 
15
  The ECD for each internally deposited radionuclide is calculated by summing the products of 
the committed equivalent doses and appropriate tissue weighting factor values for all tissues 
irradiated. The committed equivalent dose or dose equivalent is the time integral of the equivalent  
dose rate in a specific tissue following intake of a radionuclide into the body. Dose rate is a 
quotient of dose and time, often indicated as mSv/h.  
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release termination remains below 30 mSv. This assures that the 
temporary relocation intervention level reported in the IAEA Basic Safety 
Standards No. 115 is not reached. 
3. No long term action is required beyond site boundary. This means that the 
averted ECD over a period of fifty years following release termination 
remains below 100 mSv. Though this limit is lower than that 
recommended in the IAEA Basic Safety Standards No. 115 [18], it is 
considered consistent with the two above mentioned criteria by the EUR 
group. 
4. Limited economical impact linked to the restriction of foodstuff 
consumption. This means allowing free trading of foodstuffs, provided a 5 
mSv dose to individuals eating contaminated food for one year is not 
reached: 
 after one month following the end of the accident over a 30 km2 
area; 
 after one year following the end of the accident over a 10 km2 area. 
More clearly, this means that foodstuffs produced in areas of 30 km2 and 10 km2 
surrounding the site could be marketed after one month and one year 
respectively. 
As far as probabilistic criteria in sense of probabilistic targets are concerned, 
ambitious goals, some of them well in line with the international mainstream, e. g. 
INSAG 3 [25] are set as follows [22]: 
• The cumulated frequency of sequences leading to a core melt (CDF) has 
to be kept below 10-5 per reactor year for all plant states, considering 
internal as well as external events. 
• The cumulated frequency of sequences leading to unacceptable releases 
(i.e. in excess of maximum allowable releases for design extension 
conditions) has to be kept below 10-6 per reactor year. 
• The cumulated frequency of sequences leading to early containment 
failure or to very large releases – large early release frequency - (LERF) 
has to be kept below 10-7 per reactor year. 
These requirements are meant to reduce challenges to containment integrity 
through decreasing the probability of occurrence of potentially damaging 
sequences.  
The same paper [22] refers to the deterministic requirements, which have to 
be met to increase confidence in containment coping capability for severe 
accidents: 
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• Probabilistic targets for early containment failure have to be met without 
reliance on overpressure protection equipment. 
• Early containment failure has to be prevented by design (i. e. design 
provisions having adequate reliability for decreasing the probability of 
early containment failure to an acceptably low value must be 
implemented). 
• At least one severe accident sequence must be addressed in the design 
of the containment, regardless of PSA results. 
• It must be demonstrated that catastrophic failure of the reactor vessel 
bottom head cannot occur as a result of debris-water interaction. 
• Direct containment heating must be prevented by design through: 
 Providing a reliable depressurization system; 
 Designing the reactor cavity such that debris transfer to the 
containment atmosphere is minimized in case of vessel failure; 
additionally, demonstrating absence of debris dissemination to the 
containment atmosphere if vessel failure occurs with Reactor 
Coolant System (RCS) pressure below 20 bars.  
• The consequences of hydrogen generation must be accommodated 
through: 
 Providing means for hydrogen control inside containment, which 
promote natural circulation and mixing of the containment 
atmosphere; 
 Demonstrating that the probability of a global hydrogen detonation 
capable of endangering primary containment performance is 
sufficiently low to meet the probabilistic target for early containment 
failure; 
 Enhancing hydrogen dilution in the containment atmosphere; 
 Demonstrating that hydrogen concentration inside containment will 
remain below 10% (dry conditions), assuming 100% of the 
zirconium in the active part of the core has reacted with water, and 
taking credit for hydrogen mitigating devices; 
 Demonstrating that the primary containment can withstand the 
loads resulting from slow hydrogen recombination cumulated with 
the global deflagration of the 10% average concentration (adiabatic, 
isochoric, complete combustion), and assessing that containment 
leak tightness can be maintained under such conditions; 
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 Organising containment layout such that formation of local 
hydrogen pockets is prevented and the risk of transition from 
deflagration to detonation is minimized. 
• The consequences of the presence of other noncondensables must be 
accommodated through: 
 Evaluating the quantity generated in case of severe accidents and 
verifying that the containment system can withstand the 
subsequent loads; 
 Providing a small, manually actuated, filtered purge capability to 
release noncondensables in a controlled manner. 
• The containment system must be designed to guarantee that decay heat 
can be removed through: 
 Demonstrating that corium debris will relocate in a coolable 
geometry (in-vessel or ex-vessel); 
 Providing a containment heat removal system designed to operate 
in case of conditions beyond the design basis; 
 Providing a system for timely flooding the reactor cavity when 
needed for ex-vessel debris retention. 
• Devices contemplated for dealing with the consequences of severe 
accidents must have the capability of carrying out their functions under 
harsh environments expected for design extension conditions. 
The approach described above [22] can be applied also for future NPPs with 
advanced reactor concepts (ARC), which are briefly mentioned further. There is 
general international consensus that for the various nuclear ARCs, which are 
currently under development, design and operational safety goals as well as 
modern review frameworks for risk assessment required for licensing related 
decision-making shall be developed.  
The evolution of NPPs over the last approx 50 years is usually subdivided into 
four Generations [26]. The first prototype NPPs for (commercial) electricity 
production are classified as Generation I (e. g Shippingport, Dresden, Magnox), 
the currently operating ones as Generation II (LWR – PWR, BWR, WWER, 
graphite moderated RBMK). ARCs classified in Generation III are evolutionary 
improved versions of NPPs currently in operation and are in different stages of 
development and construction. These ARCs have typically 
• A standardised design for each type to expedite licensing, reduced capital 
cost and reduced construction time;  
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• A simpler and more robust design, making them easier to operate and 
less vulnerable to operational disturbances;  
• Higher availability and longer operating lifetime – typically 60 years;  
• Reduced possibility of core melt;  
• Improved mitigation of severe accidents and minimal effect on the 
environment;  
• Higher burn-up to reduce fuel use and the amount of waste, burnable 
absorbers to extend fuel life. 
The following ARCs are typical and most relevant: 
• EPR (European Pressurized Reactor), Germany/France; 
• System 80+ (PWR), USA; 
• ABWR (Advanced Boiling Water Reactor), USA/Japan. 
Evolutionary improved concepts – nowadays in the design phase – are classified 
as Generation III+. Typical and most relevant concepts are as follows: 
• SWR-1000 (BWR), Germany/France; 
• IRIS (International Reactor Innovative and Secure), PWR, IRIS 
Consortium, which is an international team of companies, laboratories 
and universities, coordinated by Westinghouse; 
• AP600/AP1000 (PWR), USA; 
• PIUS (Process Inherent Ultimate Safe), PWR, Sweden; 
• WWER-640/1000 (PWR), Russia. 
Finally, there are Generation IV concepts, or Generation IV nuclear energy 
systems comprising the nuclear reactor and its energy conversion systems, as 
well as the necessary facilities for the entire fuel cycle, from ore extraction to 
final waste disposal. The following six systems, listed alphabetically, were 
selected to Generation IV by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF)16:  
• Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor System (GFR); 
• Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor System (LFR); 
                                                 
16
 http://www.nei.org/filefolder/doe_gen_iv_diagrams.pdf 
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• Molten Sault Reactor System (MSR); 
• Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor System (SFR)  
• Supercritical Water-Cooled Reactor System (SCWR); 
• Very-High-Temperature Reactor System (VHTR). 
The above probabilistic criteria in the sense of probabilistic safety targets, i.e. 
CDF < 10-5 per reactor year, LERF (100 TBq Cs-137) < 10-7 per reactor year 
have also been applied for the new OL3 unit EPR 1600 NPP in Finland. The 
Finnish Government has in February 2005 granted a construction licence for the 
Generation III concept 1600 MWe EPR to the utility TVO at the Olkiluoto site [27]. 
 
5.4 PSA Based Source Terms to Support EP Zones  
Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA17), or synonymous with probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA18) of a NPP provides a comprehensive, structured approach to 
identifying accident scenarios and deriving numerical estimates of the risk to 
members of the public from the operation of the plant. For the purpose of this 
report the term PSA is further used. Risk is viewed as the likelihood of specified 
undesired events occurring within a specified period or in specified 
circumstances arising from the realisation of a specified hazard (a physical 
situation with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the 
environment or some combination of these) [21]. The risk may be expressed as 
either frequency (the expected number of specified events occurring in time unit, 
or a probability (the probability of a specified event following a prior event), 
depending on the circumstances. The risk in [28] is defined as probability and 
consequences of an event, as expressed by the “risk triplet” that is the answer to 
the following questions: 1) What can go wrong? 2) How likely is it? and 3) What 
are the consequences if it occurs? 
For a NPP, the PSA proceeds as follows: enumeration of sequences of events 
that could produce a core melt; clarification of containment failure modes, their 
probabilities and timing; identification of quantity and chemical form of 
radioactivity released if the containment is breached; modelling of dispersion of 
radionuclides in the atmosphere; modelling of emergency response effectiveness 
involving sheltering, evacuation, and medical treatment; and dose-response 
modelling in estimating health effects on the population exposed [29]. 
The insights gained from the PSA are used along with those from the 
deterministic analysis in the decision making process on safety issues for the 
                                                 
17 The term used in IAEA documents 
18 The term used in USNRC NUREG documents, as well as in a reference standard document [28]. 
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plant. PSAs are normally performed at three levels (L) as follows [30, 31]: 
• L1 PSA which starts from an initiating event or an internal or external 
hazard that challenges the safe operation of the plant and identifies the 
combinations of failures of the safety systems that can lead to core 
damage. This provides an estimate of the frequency of core damage and 
gives insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the safety systems 
and the emergency procedures provided to prevent core damage. 
• L2 PSA which models the phenomena that could occur following the onset 
of core damage that have the potential to challenge the containment 
integrity and lead to a release of radioactive material to the environment. 
The analysis considers the effectiveness of the design and the severe 
accident management measures that can mitigate the effects of core 
damage, and provides an estimate of the frequency and magnitude of a 
release of radioactive material to the environment. 
• L3 PSA which models the consequences of a release of radioactive 
material to the environment and provides an estimate of the public health 
and other societal risks such as the contamination of land or food.  
L1 PSAs have now been carried out for most of the NPPs worldwide. However, 
in recent years, the emerging standard has been for L2 PSAs to be carried out 
for all types of NPPs. To date, L3 PSAs in EU Member States have been 
performed for only a few plants. 
The L2 PSA provides a structured assessment of the possible accident 
sequences including their frequencies that could occur, following core damage. It 
provides insights into which of the phenomena that could arise have the greatest 
potential to lead to containment failure or bypass resulting in a release of 
radioactive material to the environment. The starting point for L2 PSA is the 
grouping of a large number of accident sequences, derived in L1 PSA, into a 
smaller number of plant damage states (PDS) in accordance with accident 
characteristics and containment response characteristics for various accident 
sequences. PDS group sequences that would be anticipated to have similar 
effects on containment response and fission product source terms. It is therefore 
important to identify those attributes of an accident progression that will influence 
either the containment response or the release of fission products to the 
environment.  
PDSs can be grouped into two main classes: those in which radioactive materials 
are initially released to the containment, and those in which the containment is 
either bypassed or ineffective. Thus, the PDSs identify the containment status 
(e.g. intact and isolated, intact and not isolated, failed or bypassed and, for 
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bypass19, the type and size of the bypass (e.g. interfacing systems LOCA20 - 
ISLOCA, steam generator tube rupture – STGR) [30]. Thus, the L2 PSA provides 
an integrated analysis that takes account of plant specific features to determine 
how the fault sequences that have occurred leading to core damage would 
progress to challenge the containment and lead to a release of radioactive 
material to the environment. The main subject related objectives of the L2 PSA 
[32] are to: 
• Gain insights into how severe accidents progress and identify plant 
specific vulnerabilities; 
• Determine how severe accidents challenge the containment and to 
identify major containment failure mechanisms; 
• Estimate the quantities of radioactive material that would be 
released to the environment for different types of accident sequences; 
• Determine the overall frequency of a large release of radioactivity 
to the environment; 
• Evaluate the impacts of various uncertainties, including assumptions 
relating to phenomena, systems and modelling, on the magnitude and 
frequency of the release; 
• Provide a basis for the identification of plant specific severe accident 
management measures and determine their effectiveness; 
• Provide an input into the development of off-site emergency plans; 
• Provide an input into the decision making model for the timely execution of 
the off-site emergency actions. 
The accident progression analysis part of the L2 PSA models the progression of 
the accident from core damage to the challenges to the containment and the 
subsequent release of radioactive material for each of the PDSs. This is 
generally carried out by using an event tree approach – referred to as either 
containment event trees (CETs) or accident progression event trees (APETs). 
The APETs/CETs provide the conditional probability21 that a containment 
failure22 can be realized, given a PDS. Typical containment failure modes and 
                                                 
19
 Containment bypass is a direct or indirect flow path that may allow the release of radioactive 
material directly to the environment bypassing the containment [28] 
20
 Interfacing systems LOCA (ISLOCA): a LOCA when a breach occurs in a system that 
interfaces with the RCS, where isolation between the breached system and RCS fails. An 
ISLOCA is usually characterized by the over-pressurization of low pressure system when 
subjected to RCS pressure and can result in containment bypass [28]. 
21
 Conditional probability is the probability of occurrence of event A, given that event C occurs. 
22
 Containment failure is loss of integrity of the containment pressure boundary from a core 
damage accident that results in unacceptable leakages of radionuclides to the environment [28]. 
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mechanisms are shown in Table 5.4 [30]. 
 
Mode of failure Mechanism for failure 
Direct bypass ISLOCA; SGTR; Externally initiated 
Isolation failure System failure; Operating mode 
Vapour explosion Rapid pressurization; Blast loads; Missile generation 
Overpressurization Steam spike; Gradual boil-off; Incondensable gases; Direct 
energy transfer 
Underpressure Inappropriate recovery of isolation failure; Inappropriate 
operation of filtered vent 
Overtemperature Core-concrete interactions; Direct contact by core debris; 
Thermal attack of penetrations  
Combustion Detonation; Deflagration to detonation transition; Deflagration 
Concrete penetration Basemat penetration; Pedestal/support failure 
Other Vessel thrust forces; Pipe whip; Random failure of RPV 
Table 5.4. Typical containment failure modes and mechanisms. 
The APETs/CETs produce a large number of end states, some of them are either 
identical or similar, in terms of key release attributes. These end states are often 
grouped together. The APETs/CETs model all the significant, physical, and 
chemical processes that could occur following a severe accident that challenge 
the containment or influence the release of radioactive material. Effectively, the 
PDSs define the initial and boundary conditions for the progression of a severe 
accident and together with appropriate two steps grouping of large number of 
CET end states form the interface between the L1 PSA and L2 PSA. The first 
groups the CET end states on the basis of similar source term phenomena to 
form source term categories (STCs) and the second one group STCs on the 
basis of similar environmental consequence to form release categories (RCs). 
The allocation of STCs to RCs is based on the potential of each source term to 
cause adverse effects. 
To sum up the previous considerations, L2 PSA provides the results of accident 
progression analysis, containment analysis and estimation of accident source 
terms based on accident sequence frequencies. The source term analysis itself 
addresses the phenomena associated with the chemical processes affecting the 
radionuclide release and formation during the accident progression, and the 
transport of the radioactive material from the fuel through the containment to the 
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environment. This analysis requires an in-depth understanding of the chemical 
and physical forms of the radionuclide species. 
Thus, the most relevant quantitative results of L2 PSA are the frequencies of the 
release categories defined in the analysis. The most common results then are 
large early release (LER)23 frequencies (LERF), which can be compared with the 
probabilistic targets for LERF, if they have been defined. However, there is no 
consensus in the EU Member States on what constitutes a large/early release 
[32]. 
It is important that the source term/release categories (sometimes referred to as 
release groups, release bins or source terms bins) are defined on the basis of 
appropriate attributes that affect fission product releases and accident 
consequences. These attributes are specific to the NPP and containment type, 
and there is no unique way to perform this task. However, Table 5.5 provides a 
list of important binning attributes for PWRs and BWRs [30]. 
The source term information that L3 PSA requires for each release category 
covers [30]: 
1. The radionuclides including also the chemical forms of each radionuclide. 
2. The frequency of release category. 
3. The amount of radionuclides released as a function of time, expressed as 
fraction of the initial core inventory for each group of radionuclides having 
similar and chemical characteristics, i. e. having similar volatility.  
4. The time of the release, which is related to reactor shutdown. 
5. The warning time for implementation of appropriate countermeasures, 
defined as time from accident initiation to the actual occurrence of a 
release. 
6. The location of the release relative to ground level (ground level release or 
elevated release). 
7. The energy content of the release, which is a function of containment 
temperature and pressure prior to failure. This is important in 
determination of the potential for plume rise. 
8. The particle size distribution of release aerosols, which will affect the 
deposition during plume transport. 
 
                                                 
23
 LER is the rapid, unmitigated release of airborne fission products from the containment to the 
environment occurring before the effective implementation of off-site emergency response and 
protective actions [28], i.e. there is the potential for early health effects. 
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Release attributes Variations 
Timing of release Very early (containment failure prior to core damage); 
Early; Intermediate; Late; 
Containment bypass/isolation ISLOCAs; SGTRs; Other initiating events; 
Mode/mechanism of release DBA leakage; BDBA leakage; Rupture; 
Basemat penetration; 
Active fission product removal 
mechanism 
 
Passive fission product removal 
mechanisms (release pathways) 
Sprays; Fan coolers; Suppression pools; Overlying 
water pools; Ice beds; Filtered vents; Others; 
 
Secondary containments; Reactor buildings; Tortuous 
pathways; 
Location of release Ground level; Elevated; 
Energy of release Low; High and energetic; 
Duration of release Rapid; Protracted; 
Table 5.5. Example of binning attributes for APET/CET end states. 
Since thermodynamic properties of some relevant fission products indicate the 
relative volatility of various core materials, they are usually grouped in 
accordance with their common chemical and physical characteristics. Various 
group structures have been proposed to date, ranging from very coarse to very 
fine groupings. Table 5.6 provides a reasonable group structure for such fission 
products, without going in details [30]. 
To recapitulate, a source term – that is, the quantity and duration of radionuclide 
release, is assigned to each STC. With the advances made in the development 
of so called system, or integrated severe accident computer codes24, the source 
terms for specific sequences can be generated directly in recent advanced L2 
PSAs. In these codes, the major radionuclide species are grouped just on the 
basis of similarity in chemical and physical properties and these default 
groupings are similarly adopted in the PSAs. A summary of the derivation of 
release categories and the attendant source terms for a number of European L2 
PSAs is provided in [33]. 
                                                 
24
 E. g. MAAP (developed by EPRI, USA and used especially for most of the US Individual Plant 
Examination – IPE Programme); MELCOR (developed by Sandia NL, USA and applied in 
essential reference study NUREG-1150 [13]); ASTEC (jointly developed by IRSN, France and 
GRS, Germany), etc., see Section 6.1. 
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Group Species 
Xe Xe, Kr 
I I, Br 
Cs Cs, Rb 
Te Te, Sb, Se 
Ba Ba, Sr 
Ru Ru, Rh, Pd, Mo, Tc 
La La, Zr, Nd, Eu, Nb, Pm, Pr, Sm, Y 
Ce Ce, Pu, Np 
Species Chemical forms 
I (gas) I2, CH3I, HI 
I (aerosol) CsI 
Cs CsOH, CsI 
Table 5.6. A reasonable group structure for fission products [30]. 
Another specific and important facet in determining appropriate EP measures is a 
meteorological assessment. Weather around the NPP site has a large impact on 
the estimated public doses. The meteorological data used in calculations of the 
off-site consequences for the severe accidents are based on actual NPP site 
specific measurements. The data is usually collected at various heights and 
locations and cover wind direction/speed, temperature, dispersion, and horizontal 
and vertical stability categories.  
The atmospheric stability conditions ranging from super-adiabatic to inversions 
have been conveniently categorized into discrete classes by Pasquill (1961). This 
approach was further developed as reported by Gifford (1976) and hence the 
classes are normally referred to as Pasquill-Gifford (P-G) stability categories. 
Each class represents a specific atmospheric condition with class A being 
“unstable” and class F being “stable”. Class G was later added to describe 
strongly “stable” conditions [34] (Table 5.7). 
The atmospheric stability is important in determination of lateral and vertical 
horizontal dispersion parameters. Neutral atmospheric conditions are given by 
the ‘D’ or (4) classification. 
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Stability class No. Description 
A 1 Very unstable 
B 2 Moderately unstable 
C 3 Slightly unstable 
D 4 Neutral 
E 5 Slightly stable 
F 6 Moderately stable 
G 7 Very stable 
 
Table 5.7. Atmospheric stability classes. 
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6. KEY SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES & PHENOMENA 
Probabilistic accident progression and source term analyses, i. e., the L2 PSA 
addresses the key phenomena and/or processes that can take place during the 
evolution of severe accidents: the response of containment to the expected 
mechanical loads and the transport of fission products from damaged core to the 
environment. Such analyses provide information about the probabilities of 
accidental radiological releases - source terms - to environment. The analyses 
also indicate the relative importance of events in terms of radioactivity of the 
released materials; these provide a basis for development of plant specific 
accident management strategies [35].  
The phenomenology of severe accidents is very complex. The severe accident 
evaluation methodologies are associated with large uncertainties. Thus 
quantitative evaluation of uncertainties associated with the results of L2 PSA 
requires, among other things, knowledge of the uncertainties in the severe 
accident phenomenology. Such known uncertainties are the major source of 
uncertainty in the results of L2 PSAs (see Chapter 7).  
A Level 2 PSA requires – besides the essential requirements, described in the 
preceding Chapter 5 - the analysis of complex physical and chemical processes 
for which only limited experimental data are available. The phenomena to be 
considered in the course of the accident after the onset of core degradation are 
usually grouped into two categories [36]: 
• Issues and phenomena associated with the thermal-hydraulics of the 
accident progression and the associated containment response. The 
associated analysis is generally referred to as: ‘Accident progression and 
containment performance analysis’. The main phenomena cover  
1) In-Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) phenomena. Apart from the 
phenomena associated with core melt progression they include in-
RPV radionuclide release and transport phenomena, which with the 
relevant reactor design characteristics impact these phenomena 
during the in-RPV phase of accident progression, and  
2) Ex-RPV phenomena immediately after the vessel failure and longer 
term behaviour. They identify the key phenomena during the ex-
RPV phase of accident progression and cover the relevant reactor 
design characteristics, leading to identification of potential 
containment failure modes and the ex-RPV radionuclide release 
and transport phenomena.  
• Issues and phenomena associated with the chemical processes affecting:  
1) The release of radionuclides and the chemical forms of radioactive 
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materials during the different phases of a severe accident, and  
2) The transport of the radioactive material from the fuel through the 
containment to the environment, if the containment is breached. 
The associated analysis is generally referred to as: ‘Source term 
analysis’. 
There are two other important aspects of severe accident phenomena: 1) 
phenomenological issues related to severe accident management, and 2) the 
perceived level of uncertainty associated with the phenomena and the likely 
impact on results of analysis. While the former is not covered by this report, a 
separate Chapter 7 has been devoted to the latter one, i. e. the issue of 
uncertainties.  
6.1 Some Severe Accident Analysis Computer Codes 
There are, in general, three types of computer codes [36]: 
• Separate phenomena codes: These codes computationally simulate the 
phenomena by using detailed models, consistent with the state-of-the-art, 
and the results of available experimental data. These codes are used 
typically in severe accident research, evaluation of severe accident 
management alternatives, and as benchmarks for the simpler, more 
parametric and integrated computer codes. 
• System, or integrated PSA codes: These codes address the set of key 
phenomena that occur during each specific severe accident sequence. 
They incorporate the thermal-hydraulics, chemical and fission product 
models into a single code for the core, primary and secondary coolant 
systems, and the containment building. These codes are designed to run 
relatively quickly so that they can carry out a large number of calculations 
necessary for the different severe accident sequences defined for a Level 
2 PSA study. To achieve this, they contain much simpler models than the 
separate phenomena codes.  
• Simple parametric codes and computational tools: These are based on 
simple parametric models which interpolate between fixed points for which 
calculations with a more detailed code have been performed to determine 
the values of the parameters. These codes are intended for specific PSA 
applications in which the assessment of uncertainties on accident 
progression pathways requires extensive repetitive calculations by varying 
the input parameters. 
Current application in L2 PSAs has tended to make use of the system, integral 
codes for providing the baseline analysis of accident sequences with limited 
supplementary analysis provided by other standalone codes for the detailed 
evaluation of certain phenomena. The further text is restricted to brief overview of 
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three system, or so called integral codes: MAAP, MELCOR, and ASTEC.  
6.1.1 Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) - MAAP4  
The Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) Modular Accident Analysis 
Program (MAAP), as a PSA tool is a fully integrated code that couples thermal-
hydraulics with fission product release and transport. It also dynamically couples 
the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), containment, and reactor/auxiliary building 
responses. It has been used for many PSAs, especially for most of the U. S. 
Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs) and Severe Accident Management 
Guidelines (SAMGs) development and implementation. Different MAAP versions 
for PWR, BWR, CANDU, and WWER reactor designs are available. Models for 
advanced LWR plant designs, including their passive features have also been 
implemented, benchmarked, and accepted for design certification [36]. It 
simulates the accident progression from a set of initiating events to either a safe, 
stable, and coolable state, or radioactive releases to the environment. These 
may result from containment bypass, leakage, or structural failure due to 
overpressure. 
Accidents have been analyzed for a variety of transients, including Loss of Offsite 
Power (LOOP), Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCAs), Main Steam Line Breaks 
(MSLBs), containment bypass, mid-loop operation25, and shutdown sequences. 
The code has been subjected to independent design review and it has also been 
reviewed by the USNRC. MAAP has been compared with other codes on: (1) 
pertinent aspects of severe accident phenomena (e.g., core melt progression, 
source term estimates for plant applications using MELCOR code), (2) 
containment response, and (3) mass and energy releases for small and 
intermediate LOCA break sizes (RELAP). 
MAAP has been validated against a variety of integral and separate-effects tests. 
Additionally, many comparisons between the MAAP code and actual plant 
transients, and accidents have been performed to illustrate the performance of 
individual models and to provide confidence in the MAAP integral results. The 
experimental validation status of the MAAP computer code in a form of 
assessment matrix is given in [36]. The main modelling areas of MAAP are: 
thermal-hydraulic modelling, core geometry and core melt modelling, 
radionuclide behaviour, and other physical processes. The latter include: the 
model for gas flammability, model for combustion completeness, model for burn 
time, RPV and vessel penetration failure models, the molten debris heat transfer 
and related models, corium-concrete interaction model, the RPV external cooling 
model, direct containment heating model and the in-RPV debris cooling model. 
MAAP4 also calculates the iodine chemistry, useful for long-term iodine 
behaviour in the containment.  
                                                 
25
 A low water level operation, i.e., mid-loop operation, is carried out for removing the residual 
heat, particularly in refueling/maintenance/repairing periods. 
 52 
MAAP models the transport and retention of fission products in the RCS and the 
generalized containment.  The materials released from the core are divided into 
12 fission product groups, according to their chemical characteristics. The fission 
product physical states modelled are: vapour, aerosol, deposited and contained 
in core or corium. In short, the MAAP aerosol model considers the combined 
effects of aerosol agglomeration and removal mechanisms, including 
gravitational settling, wall condensation, inter-compartmental transport by carrier 
gas, thermophoresis26, diffusiophoresis27, and inertial impaction. Re-vaporization 
is included as a transfer between physical states. The MAAP aerosol model uses 
correlations based on exact solutions of integro-differential equations written for 
polydisperse size distribution of aerosols; and these models are extensively 
validated.  
6.1.2 MELCOR Code 
The MELCOR code was developed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) under 
the sponsorship of the USNRC. It is a fully integrated code that replaced the 
formerly used Source Term Code Package developed by Battelle Columbus 
Division, calculating a spectrum of phenomena leading to radiological releases to 
the environment. MELCOR calculations have been performed for the essential 
reference NUREG-1150 study [13]. MELCOR is a generic code applicable for 
both PWRs and BWRs and it treats a broad spectrum of severe accident 
phenomena in a unified framework. Originally it was designed to be a fast 
running PSA severe accident code using simplified parametric models. Today, 
owing to significant advances in computing power, the latest version of MELCOR 
serves as the best estimate code for predicting plant response to severe 
accidents and place special emphasis on core degradation modelling [36].  
There is also one more significant aspect of this code. With the consolidation of 
modelling capabilities from other USNRC codes, MELCOR today stands as the 
repository of knowledge concerning severe accident and fission product release 
phenomena, benefiting significantly from important international research 
programs, including PHEBUS28 for example. The use of parametric models is, in 
general, limited to areas with great uncertainties where there is no consensus 
concerning an acceptable mechanistic approach.  
MELCOR is intended to be applied by the US NRC for:  
• PSA studies for existing and advanced LWRs,  
                                                 
26
 Particle motion in a temperature gradient, from a hotter to a colder region 
[http://jets.poudres.free.fr/index_fichiers/page0007.html] 
27
 A process in a scrubber whereby water vapour moving toward the cold water surface carries 
particulates with it [http://www.answers.com/topic/diffusiophoresis?cat=technology]  
28
 The PHEBUS-FP program is an international cooperative research program to develop 
experimental data for validating computer codes used for severe reactor accident analysis. The 
experimental work is done at the Cadarache Centre in France. Partners in this program include 
the EU, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and the USA. 
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• Best-estimate accident sequence studies to develop insights into both 
physical phenomena, as well as hardware performance,  
• Audit reviews of PSAs,  
• Accident management studies that analyse the progression of accidents 
and evaluate the detrimental and beneficial effects of various strategies.  
Today, MELCOR is being used also to assist the NRC in the design certification 
process for a number of new plant designs, including Generation III+ AP1000 
PWR and the US-EPR, and to assist the USNRC Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Office with the evaluation of numerous license amendment requests in the 
context of risk informing of regulatory processes. Additionally, MELCOR is being 
used as a code based means of conducting uncertainty analysis in L2 PSA 
applications. The code is based on specially developed models for thermal 
hydraulics, core melt, fission product release and transport processes [30, 36].  
The main modelling areas of MELCOR are the same as that of MAAP: thermal-
hydraulic modelling, core geometry and core melt modelling, other physical 
processes and radionuclide behaviour. The phenomena modelled are the 
thermal-hydraulic response in the reactor coolant system starting with the 
accident initiating event, core uncovery and heatup, hydrogen production, 
degradation and downward relocation of core materials, lower head failure of the 
reactor vessel, slumping of molten corium in the reactor cavity, attack on 
concrete surfaces by corium, heating of containment and confinement buildings, 
combustion of hydrogen-air mixture, and release of fission products from the core 
and their transport to the containment or eventually to the environment. The 
thermal-hydraulic modelling is based on the control volume approach, which - in 
the reactor core or bundle - is coupled to a special nodalisation scheme 
consisting of radial and axial cells [37]. 
6.1.3 ASTEC Code 
The ASTEC (Accident Source Term Evaluation Code) is a system code. 
Compared to MAAP and MELCOR it calculates the fission product (FP) gas 
phase chemistry along the pathway of the release (primary and secondary loop 
of RCS).  
The code, jointly developed by the French Institut de Radioprotection et de 
Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) and by the German Gesellschaft für Anlagen und 
Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) is to describe the behaviour of a whole NPP in severe 
accident (SA) conditions including engineered safety systems and procedures 
used in SA management [38]. This code is used to simulate FP release 
experiments; its specific features are described as follows.  
The aim of the code is to simulate an entire severe accident sequence from the 
initiating event through to fission product release and transport to and out the 
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containment. The applications are:  
 
• Source term determination studies;  
 
• Level 2 PSA studies;  
 
• Accident management studies;  
 
• Physical analyses of experiments to improve the understanding of the 
phenomenology.  
 
The ASTEC V1 series has been developed since 1998. Its main evolutions were:  
 
• Simulation of the front-end phase of the accident, using a new module 
CESAR for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) thermal-hydraulic 
behaviour, which allows a complete simulation of the scenarios and to 
avoid the additional use of other thermal-hydraulics codes;  
 
• Improvement of core degradation models in the new module DIVA that 
was mostly based on the models of the ICARE2 IRSN mechanistic 
code.  
The version V1.2 rev1 was released in December 2005 to European partners in 
the frame of the SARNET29 network of excellence on severe accidents. It started 
in April 2004 for a 4-year duration in the frame of the 6th
 
FP (Framework 
Programme) of the European Commission30. At present, ASTEC is playing a 
central role in SARNET in order to progressively become the reference European 
integral code. That is why its description here is more detailed in comparison with 
the above mentioned codes. The latest ASTEC version V1.3 was released in 
December 2006. 
The ASTEC validation strategy consists [36] in comparison with results of 
experimental programmes performed at various scales, and by comparison on 
reactor calculations with reference international codes (so-called ‘benchmarks’), 
e. g. [37]. The basic validation matrix aims at covering dominant phenomena 
occurring in severe accidents and to estimate the model uncertainties. Validation 
is supported by a large set of international experiments: 
• On one hand, analytical experiments that address a single phenomenon 
(separate-effect test) or few phenomena (coupled-effect test); 
• On the other hand, integral experiments (for instance PHEBUS-Fission 
                                                 
29
 Severe Accident Research NETwork supported by European Commission [www.sar-net.org]. 
30
 Contract FI6O-CT-2004-509065, “SARNET. Network of Excellence for a Sustainable Interaction 
of European research on Severe Accident Phenomenology”, 6th
 
Framework Programme, 
NUCTECH 2003-3-4.3.1-2, April 2004.  
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Product Tests at IRSN in France, QUENCH and CORA (see further text) 
at FZK in Germany); these applications allow checking of the correct 
reproduction of coupling between the code modules and the completeness 
of the modelling with respect to significant phenomena. Moreover, this 
kind of experiment has often been performed at large scale allowing better 
extrapolation to reactor scale. In a similar way, the application to the TMI-2 
severe accident is an essential exercise. 
Similarly to the above mentioned experiments, the CORA melt progression 
experiments performed on electrically heated bundles at FZK (formerly KfK) 
Karlsruhe were aimed at identifying and quantifying the mechanisms and 
sequence of events causing severe fuel damage to LWR fuel rods during heat-up 
and re-flooding. They were supported by separate-effect tests to measure the 
kinetics of chemical reactions identified as important in the integral 
experiments31. 
Cooling of an uncovered, overheated PWR core by water is the main accident 
management measure for terminating a severe accident transient. But, before 
the water succeeds in cooling the fuel elements, its injection can cause under 
certain circumstances renewed oxidation of the Zircaloy fuel rod cladding, 
leading to reheating of the rods, and to a sharp increase in hydrogen production 
and rod failure followed by the release of additional fission products. The 
additional hydrogen might threaten the containment, and the increased fission 
product release increases the source term. Evidence for these effects has been 
obtained from the analysis of the TMI2 accident, and in CORA experiments. The 
reasons for this enhanced oxidation are not yet fully understood but it is believed 
that the cracking of oxide layers due to the thermal shock and subsequent 
exposure of fresh Zircaloy to steam are significant factors. 
Because of the importance of understanding the in-vessel hydrogen source term 
that results during quenching, the QUENCH program was initiated at FZK 
Karlsruhe. The large-scale 21 rod bundle experiments in the QUENCH Facility, 
supported by extensive pre-and post-test calculations, are the highlight of the 
program. The objectives of the QUENCH experiments are to investigate the 
physical and chemical behaviour of overheated fuel elements under different 
flooding conditions, to improve the understanding of the effects of water addition 
at different stages of a degraded core and to create a data base for model 
development and code improvement. The main parameters of the test program 
are: quench medium, i.e. water or steam, fluid injection rate, extent of pre-
oxidation at onset of quenching, and the starting temperature at initiation of 
quenching or cool-down32. One of the main objectives of the QUENCH Program 
is to determine the hydrogen source term during reflooding of an over heated 
reactor core. For that reason different methods are used to determine the 
                                                 
31 http://www.edata-center.com/proceedings/1bb331655c289a0a,12dba6194fed8cf9,1720a18008afad63.html 
32http://hikwww9.fzk.de/isp45/QUENCH_Program/qprogram.htm, and 
   http://bibliothek.fzk.de/zb/berichte/FZKA6968.pdf] 
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hydrogen release rates as well as the integral hydrogen production during the 
complex and - the quench phase – highly transients experiments. 
The code validation benefits greatly from the very intensive work performed over 
more than ten years with the previous codes. Besides, the DIVA module of 
ASTEC also benefits from the very intensive validation of ICARE2 code in the 
past years on more than 50 experiments. As far as possible, selected 
experiments are ‘reference experiments’ that mostly belong to the list of code 
benchmark exercises selected by OECD expert groups (International Standard 
Problem - ISP). For instance ISP 46 (PHEBUS Fission Product T1) is one 
example of integral calculations coupling all modules. Continuous efforts on 
interpretation of all the integral PHEBUS Fission Products (FP) tests are 
performed with modules focusing on some subset of phenomena, e.g. 
SOPHAEROS for fission products behaviour in the circuit [36]. 
The PHEBUS-FP experiments simulate the major aspects of a severe accident, 
beginning with the degradation of irradiated reactor fuel, release of fission 
products, transport of fission products through a simulated reactor coolant 
system, and injection of these fission products into a model of a reactor 
containment. Fission product behaviour within the containment is examined over 
a period of about five days. This examination includes study of both aerosol 
behaviour and the chemistry of radioactive iodine33. 
The experiments in the PHEBUS-FP program are providing data that are 
valuable for validating and refining computer codes used for reactor accident 
analysis. Data from the tests have been used to refine models of core 
degradation and fuel relocation, hydrogen production, and fission product 
speciation. The data indicate needs for refining models of aerosol deposition 
within the reactor coolant system and models of the aqueous and gaseous 
chemistry of iodine within the reactor containment. 
ASTEC has progressively reached a larger European dimension [36], notably 
within the 5th Framework Programme with the EVITA project34 devoted to code 
validation by independent users. This dimension is still increasing in the frame of 
the above mentioned SARNET. The ASTEC V1.3 rev.1 latest version was 
released in December 2006 to 27 European SARNET partners. Its content and 
capabilities are described in [38]. Some examples of applications of this version 
include the first phases of the TMI2 accident, containment thermal-hydraulics and 
a severe accident sequence in a French PWR 900 MWe.  
Many applications have been performed on various accident sequences (Station 
Black-Out (SBO), Small or Medium LOCAs, and Loss of Steam Generator 
Feedwater (LFW), extending the scope of applicability to Large Break LOCA and 
to SGTR sequences. The latest version allows complete calculations up to iodine 
                                                 
33
 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/letters/2002/4921995.html 
34
 Allelein, H. J., et al: European validation of the integral code ASTEC (EVITA), Nuclear 
Engineering and Design 221 (2003). 
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behaviour in containment of different sequences on PWR 900 and 1300, Konvoi 
1300, WWER-440 and WWER-1000. The numerical robustness has been largely 
improved, in particular on Molten-Core Concrete Interaction (MCCI) situations 
with presence of water in the cavity [38].  
ASTEC has a modular structure, each code module simulates a reactor 
component or a physical phenomenon in fully coupled or stand-alone mode, see 
Figure 6.1, taken from [36].  
Data is exchanged between the ASTEC modules through a dynamic memory at 
macro-time steps, i.e. evolving throughout the calculation [36]. 
• CESAR module deals with two-phase thermal-hydraulics in the Reactor 
Coolant System (RCS). The RCS discretization is an assembly of 0D 
elements (volume with homogeneous fluid or with a swollen water level for 
two-phase flow situations) and 1D elements (pipe with axial mesh)  
 
 
Figure 6.1. ASTEC Modules and Structure [36]. 
connected with junction elements. Two phases are considered: water and gas 
mixture. 
• DIVA module simulates the in-vessel core degradation (most models are 
derived from the ICARE2 IRSN mechanistic code for core degradation). 
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The main phenomena are modelled, namely: fuel-rod ballooning and 
failure, exothermic oxidation of Zircaloy cladding by steam and concurrent 
hydrogen production, core heat-up and formation of mixtures of molten 
materials (corium) at high temperatures (as high as 3000K) with corium 
pool formation and growth, corium slumping through internal core 
structures until it reaches the vessel lower head, corium accumulation 
heating the lower head until melt-through or mechanical failure of the 
vessel. Degradation of control rods (Ag-In-Cd or B4C materials) is also 
modelled. 
• ELSA module calculates the release of fission products, actinides and 
structural materials (Ag, In, Cd, Sn, etc.) from the core. The semi-empirical 
approaches deal with three fission product classes (volatile, semi-volatile 
and non-volatile) for solid fuel (intact rods, debris) by only modelling the 
dominant phenomena for each class. For example in the case of volatiles: 
species intra-granular diffusion through UO2 fuel grains, taking into 
account the fuel oxidation and the fuel grain-size distribution. Actinides 
and low volatile fission products are released after a severe degradation of 
the fuel rods. The release from a corium molten pool is modelled by a non-
ideal solution for phase distribution and an ideal solution for fission 
products release. 
• SOPHAEROS module computes the aerosol and vapour transport through 
the RCS via gas flow to the containment. Using five physical states 
(suspended aerosols, suspended vapours, vapour condensed on walls, 
deposited aerosols, and adsorbed vapours), the mechanistic or semi-
empirical approaches model the main vapour-phase phenomena (such as 
gas phase equilibrium chemistry, homogeneous and heterogeneous 
nucleation) and aerosol phenomena (agglomeration, turbulent diffusion, 
thermophoresis, diffusiophoresis, impaction in bends and constrictions 
and remobilization of deposits). The module calculates aerosol 
mechanical resuspension and abrupt changes of pipe sections as well. 
The main feature of SOPHAEROS module is the materials database 
including the thermo-chemical properties of about one thousand chemical 
species. This allows to calculate the chemical forms composed from 
fission product elements and to identify the most significant ones from the 
multitude of possible chemical forms. 
• RUPUICUV module aims at evaluating Direct Containment Heating 
(DCH). After vessel lower head rupture, corium is discharged at high 
temperature driven by primary pressure into the cavity (vessel blowdown, 
cavity pressurization), where some part of the ejected corium may be 
entrained into the containment and contribute to its heat-up. Two kinds of 
cavities are accounted for: one with an annular space around the vessel 
like in European PWRs, and one with several intermediate compartments 
between cavity and containment like in USA PWRs. 
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• MEDICIS module for MCCI with a lumped-parameter approach for corium 
layers. Corium remaining in the cavity interacts with substrate concrete 
leading to concrete ablation and release of incondensable gases (H2, CO, 
CO2) into the containment. Water injection upon the corium surface is 
accounted for (including water ingression and melt eruption). Corium pool 
configurations may be either mixed or stratified (metal/oxide).  
• CPA module for containment thermal hydraulics and aerosol behaviour, 
based on a “lumped-parameter” approach. Most models are derived from 
former GRS codes (RALOC and FIPLOC). The containment can be 
nodalised as several 0-D zones, each representing one real compartment 
surrounded by walls (such as dome or casemates). The containment 
atmosphere heats up under the effect of sources of steam, fission product 
gases and aerosols, and pressure increases. CPA describes phenomena 
such as gas distribution, pressure build up, hydrogen combustion and the 
behaviour of engineered safety systems such as Passive Autocatalytic 
Recombiners (PAR) and sprays. The code describes aerosol and fission 
products transport and depletion where, for example, much of the aerosol 
settles on horizontal surfaces. 
• IODE module for iodine behaviour in the containment. This module 
describes in a kinetic way (i.e. in non-equilibrium) chemical 
transformations of iodine in aqueous and gaseous phases, iodine mass 
transfer between sump and atmosphere and its adsorption/desorption on 
painted and metal walls. 
The Material Data Bank (MDB) library groups together all material 
characteristics: properties of simple materials and corium mixtures (such as 
enthalpy or density), ideal chemistry (equilibrium reactions), iodine chemistry 
(kinetics), fission product isotopes (decay heat and transmutation rates). A 
significant effort was done on validation of the two-phase thermal-hydraulics in 
RCS and of MCCI. With respect to the previous version, the newest released 
ASTEC V1.3 version presents the following main model improvements [38]:  
• General model of RCS pumps, applicable to any type of reactor,  
• Improvements of models of corium behaviour in the vessel lower plenum,  
• Quenching of fission products at their arrival in the containment,  
• Release of structure materials from the core and the in-vessel corium 
molten pools.  
The ASTEC code was used for IRSN L2 PSA studies of the 900 and 1300 MWe 
French PWRs. A significant number of scenarios that differ in initiating event and 
in the actuation of safety systems are being analysed. Furthermore, in the EVITA 
project, several benchmarks on plant applications have been performed including 
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comparison with other integral codes such as the MELCOR and MAAP4 codes. 
These were performed on the following reactor types: French PWR 900, German 
Konvoi 1300, Westinghouse AP1000, VVER-440/V-213 and V-230, and VVER-
1000. These benchmarks are currently completed or extended in the SARNET 
[36].  
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7. TREATING UNCERTAINTIES  
 
Since L2 PSA is a major contributor of information to EZ, this chapter, though 
generic in its nature (the concepts shown are applicable to many systems where 
uncertainty is an issue), will focus on the treatment of uncertainties in this area of 
nuclear safety. L2 PSA is a systematic way to study, from the point of view of 
safety and with the restrictions of a specific methodology, the behaviour of a 
system (NPP under accident or quasi-accident conditions) when uncertainty is 
present and widespread. The starting point of level 2 is the result of a L1 PSA. 
The outcome of such study is a huge quantity of accident sequences that are 
grouped, according to different criteria regarding accident characteristics and 
potential containment responses, into a manageable number of plant damage 
states (PDS). After an appropriate screening of very low probability sequences, 
the probabilistic progression of accidents is studied using event trees, commonly 
known as accident progression event trees (APET) or containment event trees 
(CET), under two possibilities: large event trees (virtually all questions regarding 
severe accident are included as top events) and small event trees (only main 
questions regarding severe accident phenomena are included as top events). 
The use of these event trees leads to getting a huge quantity of end states, which 
have to be grouped (see Chapter 5), as in the case of PDSs, to get a more 
manageable set of release categories (RCs), later used to estimate all the variety 
of different possible source terms. 
Uncertainty is really pervasive in a L2 PSA. The first matter of concern is the 
starting point. Is really complete the picture obtained as an output from the L1 
PSA? Could there be any ‘hole’ in the picture? Is completely meaningful the set 
of PDS obtained? In order to get the end states, computer codes that simulate 
the behaviour of the plant in a deterministic way have to be run under the 
containment event tree structure. Do they reproduce the behaviour of the system 
in an accurate way? Are we able to estimate accurately branching probabilities? 
Are we able to model the accident event sequence in the right order and with the 
right intervals between events? Do we have the necessary data to feed the 
computer codes we are using? These and other questions are key issues when 
dealing with uncertainties in L2 PSA.  
 
7.1 Uncertainty sources 
The last paragraph could be summarised saying that uncertainty arises in three 
areas of the L2 PSA: 1) definition of plant damage states and release categories, 
2) simulation of the problem, including event tree construction and 
phenomenological models (computer codes) used to simulate the physical-
chemical processes involved, and 3) data used to feed models. This is what 
typically has been classified as scenario, model and parameter uncertainty. 
Scenario uncertainty is sometimes called completeness uncertainty. 
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Nevertheless, attending to their real origin, these types of uncertainty may be re-
classified as aleatory and epistemic or lack of knowledge uncertainty. 
Aleatory uncertainties are usually associated to parameters with some inherent 
variability. Aleatory uncertainties arise when an experiment is repeated several 
times under equivalent conditions and the results obtained differ from each other. 
An example of a parameter affected by this kind of uncertainty is the time taken 
by a safety system to start after its actuation is demanded. In this case, variability 
comes from the set of physical and chemical processes involved. Increasing the 
number of observations (experiments) does not make aleatory uncertainty to 
decrease, the standard deviation of the variable itself will not decrease, but will 
allow knowing with more accuracy the probability density function (PDF) followed 
by that parameter, i.e. the type of PDF and the parameters that characterise it. 
So, if that time follows a Weibull distribution, increasing the number of 
observations will allow knowing more accurately the standard deviation and the 
shape parameter. 
Epistemic uncertainties are related to the existence of lack of knowledge about 
the problem. This type of uncertainty affects not only parameters, but also 
models, PDSs and source terms (STs). A parameter will be affected by epistemic 
uncertainty when it is not random, but we cannot measure it, either because it is 
impossible or because it is extremely expensive to do it. This type of uncertainty 
is completely different of the aleatory uncertainty. Parameters affected by 
aleatory uncertainty are fully described by their associated PDFs. In the case of 
parameters affected by epistemic uncertainty, what we do is to characterise our 
uncertainty about the parameter, and we do it through PDFs. Those PDFs 
summarise our state of knowledge about what values the parameter could be 
close to more likely or less likely. Many parameters (coefficients) of models used 
in the area of severe accidents are affected by lack of knowledge uncertainty; 
they are not random, but their values are unknown, so PDFs have to be used to 
characterise them. This type of uncertainty affects most of the parameters used 
in severe accident codes. 
Epistemic uncertainty does also affect models. Sometimes, there are several 
models to describe the behaviour of the system; some of them describe the 
behaviour of the system under some circumstances and others under other 
circumstances, and it is not clear at all how to take that fact into account in the 
analysis. Think just of two different nodalisations for the same computer code. 
Some authors consider [55] appropriate to assign probabilities to the different 
alternative models and to run one of them or another one according to those 
probabilities. Another alternative is to build up a metamodel that includes, as sub-
models, the different models and runs either one sub-model, or another one 
depending on the values sampled and which models fit better experimental 
results under those circumstances. Under any circumstances, only validated 
codes, or at least non-invalidated, should be used. 
In a PSA uncertainties propagate through the whole study. Those that arise in L1 
PSA propagate into L2 PSA and those, together with the ones that arise in the L2 
PSA itself propagate into L3 PSA, where they are combined with the intrinsic 
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uncertainties of L3 PSA. 
Current L1 PSA is a very mature area of knowledge. The main uncertainty arises 
from the possibility of omitting some not very unlikely sequences that could lead 
to a significant PDS (completeness or scenario uncertainty). This could produce 
an underestimation of that PDS. The binning of L1 PSA sequences into PDSs 
can also introduce uncertainty. The binning process consists in classifying 
sequences in different PDSs according to a set of variables that provides 
relevant information about the physical status (the pressure of the coolant in the 
primary system being the most important one in PWRs) of the plant and the 
availability of safety systems. Variables used in the classification are continuous 
and any classification based on setting limits on continuous variables is 
somewhat arbitrary. An inadequate classification could lead to a wrong 
propagation of uncertainties through the L2 PSA model. 
A key step in the L2 PSA is the design of the APETs. The correct definition of the 
APETs involves the inclusion of the right events, no omission of any relevant 
event or process, the right order and the right number of events, including also 
the right timing between successive events, which usually depends on the 
correct simulation of stochastic events. Additionally, phenomenological models 
(i.e. MELCOR, ASTEC, etc.) are used to simulate the behaviour of the plant 
under such accident sequence. An example of this is the construction of an 
APET to study sequences with important generation of hydrogen (H2). 
Uncertainty appears everywhere in such a sequence: possibility of more than 
one combustion in the same sequence (model uncertainty), occurrence of 
ignition sources (random uncertainty, correct simulation of stochastic events), 
distribution of H2 /air/steam in the containment (model uncertainty), percentage of 
H2 burnt in a given combustion/detonation (model uncertainty), conditions for 
reaching different flammability regimes (parameter uncertainty), etc. Many other 
physical-chemical phenomena that can happen in an accident sequence are 
subject to important model and parameter uncertainties such as direct 
containment heating (DCH), in-vessel and ex-vessel steam explosions, vessel 
rocketing, fission products resuspension and molten core – concrete interaction 
(MCCI), among others. 
Uncertainties may also arise in the last step of L2 PSA, the binning of accident 
sequences in RCs. As in the case of PDSs, a set of variables must be identified. 
Later on, the binning of sequences is done according to the values of these 
variables in the sequences. The omission of important variables and the 
selection of non-appropriate limits in each variable may produce an inadequate 
final set of RCs. 
L3 PSA is also deeply affected by uncertainty. Main uncertainties affect 
atmospheric dispersion models used to simulate the radioactive plume transport 
(model uncertainty and parameter uncertainty). The meteorological database 
used is a good example of random parametric uncertainty, while many of the 
parameters used in the atmospheric models, such as centreline concentrations 
(χc/Q) and standard deviations of crosswind locations at release height (σy) are 
good examples of epistemic parametric uncertainty. 
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7.2. Input uncertainty assessment 
Input uncertainty assessment is the process of characterising through probability 
density functions (PDFs) or probability mass functions the uncertainty about 
continuous and discrete input random variables. There are essentially two ways 
how to do it: Using classical inferential methods and using Bayesian methods. 
Expert judgment is a third way to do it, which constitutes, in this context, an 
extension of Bayesian methods. 
7.2.1 Classical inferential methods 
Classical inference methods are based on the assumptions of having a random 
sample and knowing the probability model from which the data come from. There 
are several methods, some of them recently developed, like Jackknife and 
Bootstrap35 [56], but the best known and most widely used methods are 
Maximum Likelihood method and the Method of Moments. The main shortcoming 
of all these methods is the need of large sample sizes not easily obtainable 
under the restrictions of a complicated engineering facility in order to get good 
quality estimates, which limits their applicability in this field. 
 
Method of Moments 
This is probably the oldest inferential method to estimate the parameters of a 
PDF. K. Pearson developed the method of moments by the end of 19th century. 
The idea is quite simple. It consists in taking as an estimator of a parameter its 
equivalent sample quantity. So, the sample mean is the estimator for the mean, 
the sample variance is the estimator for the variance and so on. 
 
Maximum Likelihood Method  
Maximum Likelihood Method is the most widely known and most powerful 
estimation method in the classical context. Let us assume that we wish to study a 
random variable X (parameter affected by uncertainty) whose type of distribution 
function f(X/θ) is known, but whose parameter θ is unknown. In order to estimate 
θ we take a random sample - ),...,,( 21 nXXXX =
r
, which is supposed to be a 
random vector, whose components are independent and identically distributed, so 
that its joint probability density function is 
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35
 Jackknife and Bootstrap are resampling methods, which are based on treating the sample 
obtained as the population itself and resampling from it to get estimates of statistics of interest 
(mean, variance, etc.) 
 65 
It is important to notice that in this expression, under the classical statistics view, 
before sampling, θ is unknown, but has a given value. The objective is to 
determine what value, among the infinite values that θ could take, makes more 
likely obtaining the sample actually obtained. So, the problem is to find the value 
of θ for which function (1) gets its maximum value. Specific applications and 
guidance may be found in standard Statistics books such as reference [57].  
 
7.2.2 Bayesian inference methods 
Bayesian interpretation of probability makes Bayes’ formula a powerful tool to 
update degrees of belief when new information is available about an event or a 
proposition. Let H be the knowledge of a person, and let { } Iiiz ∈ be a partition of 
the sample space of events. The Bayesian probability provided by the person for 
an event kz , is )/( HzP k . The acquisition of a set of new evidence H’ induces a 
change in the probability given by Bayes’ formula 
 
)/'(
)/(),/'()',/(
HHP
HzPzHHPHHzP kkk
⋅
= ,                                     (2) 
 
where )',/( HHzP k  is the ‘a posteriori’ probability of kz , )/( HzP k  is the ‘a priori’ 
probability of kz and ),/'( kzHHP  is the likelihood of evidence conditional on 
knowledgeH  and the occurrence of event kz . )/'( HHP  is the probability of new 
evidence conditional on previous knowledge. That means that the a posteriori 
probability is proportional to the a priori probability and to the likelihood of 
evidence. 
Two remarkable results are obtained from (2). If the a priori probability of an 
event is zero, the a posteriori probability will remain zero, even though the 
evidence against it could be very strong. So, much care should be taken when 
providing a priori probabilities. Null a priori probabilities should be avoided, 
unless total evidence of the impossibility of the events or propositions under 
study is available. The second result is related to the existence of strong 
evidence. In that case, the likelihood will be completely dominant and the a priori 
probability will be almost irrelevant (the a posteriori probability and the likelihood 
will be almost equal). This is the case of large sample sizes, for which relative 
frequencies and Bayesian probabilities will be almost equal. Specific applications 
and guidance may be found in standard Bayesian Statistics books such as 
reference [58].  
Bayesian estimation is mostly adequate when there are not many specific 
available data but generic information from other providers or other similar NPPs 
can be obtained and used to create a first estimate (a priori distribution). 
Bayesian methods are widely applied in L1 PSA and, to a less extent in L2/L3 
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PSA. 
7.2.3 Expert judgment 
The use of Expert Judgment (EJ) techniques is unavoidable in a L2 PSA due to 
the lack of data about many of the involved phenomena. In some cases, it is 
almost impossible, from a physical point of view, to get the data needed to feed 
computer codes. In other cases the cost of getting them is so high that only a few 
of them may be obtained.  
Report NUREG-1150 [13] shows the results of the whole PSA methodology 
applied to estimate the risk associated to five NPPs in USA. This is the first large-
scale project where expert judgment was extensively and systematically used to 
collect relevant information. Regarding L1 PSA, two expert panels addressed six 
issues; while five expert panels addressed twenty-two issues in L2 PSA. This 
study highlighted the importance of EJ as an unavoidable source of information 
to deal with very sophisticated safety problems. 
Between 1990 and 1999, the European Commission (EC) and the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (USNRC) sponsored a large joint uncertainty study of 
accident consequence codes (MACCS and COSYMA) for NPP using EJ. Several 
expert panels participated in the elicitation of many code input parameters in six 
fields: 1) atmospheric dispersion and deposition, 2) deposited material and 
external doses, 3) food chain, 4) internal dosimetry and 5) late health effects. A 
summary of main results of this study and a short description of the methodology 
used is available in reference [59]. 
The bullet list shown in the next lines provides the steps of a generic EJ protocol 
based on the experience accumulated during the last decades in this area of 
knowledge: 
• Selection of project team; 
• Definition of the questions to be studied; 
• Selection of experts; 
• Training; 
• Tasks definition; 
• Individual experts’ work; 
• Elicitation of experts’ opinions; 
• Analysis and aggregation of results; 
• Documentation. 
 
Selection of project team 
The project team consists of analysts and generalists. Analysts are in charge of 
organising the steps of the protocol, so, they should have a sound background in 
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Probability and Statistics Theory, in Knowledge Psychology and in Elicitation 
Techniques. Additionally, they should be skilful in working with people, since they 
have to extensively interact with experts. The number of analysts needed 
depends on the extent and scope of the EJ application, though usually a couple 
of analysts will be enough, even for large applications. Generalists provide help 
to the analysts in all subjects related to the specific area of knowledge of the 
problem to be solved. They should be able to help experts when decomposing a 
problem and they should be skilful at getting information sources as needed. So, 
they should have a good general knowledge about the problem at hand, though 
they do not need to be leading experts in that field. The organisation interested in 
the EZ study usually provides the generalists. 
 
Definition of the questions to be studied 
Once the project team has been made, analysts and generalists must define the 
questions to be evaluated by the experts. The starting point for any question to 
be solved is usually vague. It is completely necessary to arrive at a complete 
definition of the parameters whose uncertainty we want to characterise. 
Complete definition of a parameter means the full definition of the parameter, the 
initial conditions to evaluate it and any other implicit hypothesis under the initial 
conditions. The final definition should be extremely clear and accurate, with no 
ambiguity. 
After the full definition of the question, a list with all relevant sources of 
information should be done. Potential decompositions of the parameters could be 
done. The list of references to be considered in the list must show the actual 
state of knowledge in that area, but independence and reliability of the sources 
should always be kept in mind. 
When experts are expected to use computer codes for their assessment, the 
project team should foresee the potential training of experts in uncertainty 
propagation techniques (sampling, response surfaces, estimation, order 
statistics, etc.).  
 
Selection of experts 
The only objective of this phase is to select the most qualified experts to perform 
the assessment. Qualified experts are those that: 1) have the necessary 
knowledge and experience to perform the assessment, 2) are willing to 
participate in the assessment, and 3) do not have important motivational biases. 
The first step to get the final list of experts is to start with a large list of potential 
experts. That first list could be based on the opinion of the generalist plus a 
thorough search in the scientific literature about that area. A screening should be 
done checking the three points in the list above. If necessary, interviews should 
be done to check those conditions, mainly the third one. After performing the 
screening, a shorter list should be obtained, from which the final selection of 
experts will be done. In order to arrive at the final list, two criteria should be taken 
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into account: The number of experts to assess each question should preferably 
be between three and five (based on Bayesian combination of opinions criteria) 
and the experts should have as much diversity as possible (different background, 
different types of institutions, etc.). 
 
Training 
The objective of this phase is to let experts know normative aspects of EJ 
elicitation processes. This main objective may be decomposed as the following 
sub-objectives: a) motivate experts to let them provide rigorous assessments, b) 
let them remember basic concepts of Probability and Statistics, c) provide them 
training in the assessment of Bayesian probabilities, and d) let them be aware of 
basic issues related to knowledge biases. 
During the motivation phase the experts must get information to point out the 
importance of the work they are going to do. Firstly, the project team explains to 
the experts the study frame where their opinions will be used, stressing the part 
of the study where their opinions are relevant. Secondly, the necessity of EJ will 
be explained, letting them be aware of the concept of Lack of Knowledge 
Uncertainty, and how it links to them. Thirdly, the project team should let them 
know that the key issue is not to predict a single value of each parameter under 
study, but characterising their uncertainty, allowing others to know the actual 
state of knowledge in that area. 
After remembering basic Probability and Statistics concepts, the experts get 
some training about assessing Bayesian probabilities, which includes: accurate 
definition of questions to be assessed (making explicit implicit hypotheses, 
showing well/non-well posed questions), decomposition as a way to simplify 
assessments (use of influence diagrams, event trees and uncertainty 
propagation techniques) and adequate evaluation of different evidences in order 
to assess probabilities (use of Bayes’ theorem and concepts of independence 
and reliability of information sources). 
The last part of the training session is dedicated to explain Knowledge biases to 
the experts in order to teach them to provide more reliable opinions, i.e. 
representativeness, availability, and anchor and adjustment. Experts should be 
informed of the hazard of being overconfident. A calibration exercise could be 
appropriate. The whole training session should not take more than one morning. 
 
Tasks definition 
This step is done through an interactive session of the project team and the 
experts. The issue at hand is to explain to the experts, in a detailed way, the 
questions to be assessed and to make a schedule of the activities to be 
developed by each expert. All the work developed by the project team during the 
Definition of the Problem phase should be used now. The session should start 
with a presentation by the generalist of the parameters to be assessed, including 
all relevant sources of information previously identified. Experts should provide 
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their own view of the problem and the definition of the parameters, pointing out, if 
needed, further information sources, computations to be made, etc. The result of 
this session, eventually, would be a refined definition of the parameters under 
study. Common definitions to all the experts should be agreed. 
The second step in this meeting is to study the possible ways to decompose 
each parameter. The project team should provide a seminal decomposition that 
should be discussed with the experts. The objective is to help the experts to 
develop their own decompositions. Decompositions could be quite different from 
one expert to another one. Experts will have to assess uncertainties of variables 
in the lowest levels. The analysts will usually do its aggregation. This is the point 
to introduce propagation of uncertainties concepts to the experts and to let them 
know all the potential variety of tools that the analysts could provide them to pre-
process and post-process probabilistic runs of computer codes, or of the simple 
decomposition model developed by experts. 
 
Individual experts’ work 
Experts develop their analysis during this phase, according to the schedule 
agreed in the previous step. Each expert will write by the end of this period a 
report summarising the main hypothesis and procedures used during his/her 
work, the conclusions achieved and, if he/she wishes, a preliminary assessment 
of uncertainties. Whenever needed during this period, the project team should be 
available to each expert in order to provide statistical support, or to solve any 
doubt about the parameters to be assessed. 
At the end of this phase, the project team organises a meeting with all the 
experts. Each expert presents his/her work and the conclusions achieved. This 
meeting allows each expert to get some hints about alternative ways to tackle the 
problem. 
 
Elicitation of experts’ opinions 
The elicitation of each expert’s opinions is individual and should be done in a 
quiet environment, if possible without interruptions. It is convenient to have the 
presence of an analyst and a generalist, in addition to the expert. In a systematic 
way, the analyst gets the opinion of the expert for each parameter, asking for 
supporting reasons whenever necessary. The role of the generalist in this 
session is to provide additional information when needed, to provide general 
support and to audit the session in order to avoid irregularities (bias induction, 
etc.). Whenever needed, the analyst could ask questions in a different way to 
check potential inconsistencies. The session must be recorded as much as 
possible (tape recorders, video or extensive hand annotations). 
The techniques used to help the expert when assessing uncertainties are quite 
standard: quantile assessment for continuous variables and probability 
estimations for discrete variables (direct or indirect methods); in the case of 
experts with some skills in probability other techniques like direct parameter 
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assessment or drawings are acceptable.  
 
Analysis and aggregation of results 
Assessments provided by experts are studied in this phase. The objective is to 
check that there are not important biases and the logic correctness of their 
rationale. If biases and logic faults are not present in experts’ assessments, next 
step is to check if individual opinions may be aggregated to get a unique 
distribution for each parameter.  
Before aggregating individual distributions, one condition should be checked. It is 
related to the overlap between distributions of different experts. If the distributions 
do not overlap, it means that essentially the experts disagree. In that case 
aggregation should be avoided. Under these circumstances a reconciliation 
session could be of help. An analyst should lead the session and should organise 
it according to the following steps: 1) exposition of different opinions, 2) 
identification of differences, 3) discussion about the reasons for each original 
assessment, 4) discussion about the different sources of information used, and 5) 
re-elaboration of individual opinions in posterior elicitation sessions or joint 
assessment (through consensus) of a common distribution, if agreed by experts. 
In the case that a consensus distribution is obtained, that is the final step (before 
documentation). If further elicitation sessions are needed, the consistency of the 
opinions is checked again and aggregation is done if acceptable overlap is 
achieved. Otherwise, the project team should choose what opinions could be 
aggregated as main opinion of the group (after aggregation), and what opinions 
should be left as an alternative to perform sensitivity analysis. The main 
strategies for aggregation are the following ones: 1) linear combination, 2) log-
linear combination and 3) Bayesian combination. 
 
Documentation 
Documentation of the application must be as complete as possible, including 
results and description of the ways to obtain them. The contents of the 
documentation should follow the order of application of the procedure, recording, in 
each step, what has been done, why it has been done, how it has been done and 
who has done it. In order to achieve this degree of documentation, a schedule of 
standardised documentation activities should be made for each phase. It should 
always be completely clear to the reader what is a result assessed by an expert 
and what results is the outcome of an aggregation, sensitivity analysis or any other 
analysis not provided explicitly by an expert. 
Given the general validity and the wide experience acquired in this type of 
protocols designed to provide best quality information and PDFs, its inclusion as 
one more task in the EZ decision making process would be desirable and could 
improve it. 
Reference [60] provides an up to date review of EJ techniques and protocols. 
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Reference [61] provides a set of applications of EJ in different technology areas. 
Reference [62] is a recent and good review article about methods to elicit PDFs. 
 
7.3 Uncertainty propagation 
In a L2 PSA it is necessary to estimate as accurately as possible all relevant 
output variables. The full characterisation of a random variable is given by its 
probability density function or, equivalently, by its integral, the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF), or its complementary curve to 1 (CCDF). A part of the 
information contained in those curves is summarised by some numeric statistics 
like the mean, the standard deviation and order statistics, among others. 
Additionally, there are several graphics that provide visual information about the 
shapes of the aforementioned functions.  
The Monte Carlo method is based on sampling the vector of input parameters, 
running the system model computer code for each sample of that vector in order 
to get a sample of the vector of output variables, and estimating the 
characteristics of the output variables using the output samples obtained. One of 
the benefits of using the Monte Carlo method is that many statistical standard 
estimation methods and tests may be used to estimate the output variables 
distributions and to test any hypothesis. This makes it the most straightforward 
and powerful method available in the scientific literature to deal with uncertainty 
propagation in complex models. 
 
7.3.1 Most commonly used statistics 
The most widely used statistics to summarise the information contained in a 
sample are the sample mean ( xˆ ) and the sample standard deviation (Sˆ ). They 
are respectively estimators of the mean and the standard deviation of the 
variable. Additionally, both of them are used to provide approximate confidence 
interval for the mean of the studied variable. 
Quite important statistics are the order statistics. Given a sample of size 
n },...,,{ 21 nnxxX = , the order statistics obtained from this sample are 
)()2()1( ,...,, nxxx , where the number between brackets stands for the number of 
order ( )1(x stands for the smallest observation in the sample, )(nx stands for the 
largest observation). There are two important facts related to these statistics: 1) 
any order statistic )( ix is an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the i/n quantile 
of the studied variable, and 2) based on their distributional properties, exact 
distribution-free confidence intervals may be provided for any quantile. 
Distribution-free means that the confidence intervals generated do not rely on 
assuming any specific type of distribution for the variable. This is an extremely 
important result since it allows providing estimates for any percentile (the 
median, 95%, 99%, etc.) of a random variable and exact confidence intervals (for 
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large enough sample sizes). 
 
7.3.2 Uncertainty range and confidence interval estimation 
Usually, Safety Goals are defined in terms of some specific statistical quantities, 
normally means or some pre-specified quantiles (50%, 75%, 90%, 95%, 99%, 
99.9%, 99.99%, etc.). Nevertheless, providing just the estimates of those 
quantities does not say much about the quantities themselves. One observation 
is enough to provide an estimate of the mean and two observations are enough 
to provide an estimate of the median (quantile 50%) and the standard deviation, 
but, certainly, nobody would trust the estimates provided by samples as small as 
those mentioned in the last sentence. Thus, the question is: how large should our 
sample be in order to provide meaningful and believable estimates? The answer 
to this question is provided by the theory of interval estimation (confidence 
intervals) and by tolerance intervals results (based on order statistics theory), 
and depends on what we want to estimate and to guarantee. 
Interval estimation is a part of statistical inference whose objective is to generate 
confidence intervals for different quantities. A confidence interval of a given 
quantity, like for example of a mean, a standard deviation, a probability or a 
median, is, roughly speaking, an interval that will be based on the sampled data. 
A priori, before computing it, we know that it will contain, with a pre-specified 
probability, the quantity to be estimated. As previously mentioned, provided large 
enough samples, exact confidence intervals may be provided for any quantile. 
The case of the mean is completely different, exact confidence intervals are 
available only for a few distributions, such as normal or exponential distributions. 
For any other distribution, only approximate intervals are available, which are 
based on the asymptotic normality of the mean. Such property is not easy to 
demonstrate. 
A tolerance interval (L,U), usually determined by the maximum and the minimum 
observations in a sample, is defined as an interval for which we can guarantee 
that, with a pre-specified probability (β), a given proportion (γ) of the random 
variable is contained within them. In mathematical notation this is 
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In this sense we speak about, for instance, a 95%/99% tolerance interval 
(γ=0.95, β=0.99), as an interval that will contain 95% of the values of the random 
variable under study with probability 99%. The problem to be solved is how large 
should the sample be to guarantee with probability (at least) β that a proportion 
(at least) γ of the studied variable is contained between the limits L and U to be 
estimated. ‘At least’ comes from the fact that is impossible to fit exactly those to 
conditions imposed, so that we try to be on the safe side. Tolerance intervals 
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may be two-sided or one sided. A two sided interval is obtained when no 
restriction is imposed on U and L; a one-sided interval is obtained when either U 
or L are fixed (either to a physical threshold or to ±∞ ). The following table shows 
minimum sample sizes to get such tolerance intervals. 
 
 Two sided tolerance intervals One-sided tolerance intervals 
Β \ γ 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.99 
0.90 38 77 388 22 45 230 
0.95 46 93 473 29 59 299 
0.99 64 130 662 44 90 459 
 
Table 7.1. Minimum sample size for one and two sided tolerance intervals for 
different values of β and γ. 
 
7.3.3 Variance reduction techniques 
In many actual applications, applying simple Monte Carlo may be prohibitive, 
conditional on the code used. In those cases, variance reduction techniques 
could be of use to reduce the computational costs. Variance reduction 
techniques allow the user to get the same accuracy with a lower computational 
cost. Main techniques are Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS), stratified sampling, 
control variates, importance sampling and antithetic variates, among others. 
 
7.3.4 The use of surrogate models  
Some of the computer codes used to simulate severe accidents or some L2 PSA 
models are very expensive in computational terms, so that, in many cases, it is 
unthinkable to run them as many times as needed to get accurate probabilistic 
results. In those cases it could be of interest to seek for good predictors that 
could be used as surrogate models (or synonym “response surface” or 
“metamodel”) to be run instead of the real models. 
 
7.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is a formal task included in PSA, though it is not actually 
implemented in PSA codes. PSA practitioners with a good background in 
statistics and sensitivity analysis apply these techniques to PSA results with the 
help of SA specific software. SA techniques may be used pursuing different 
objectives, all of them related to getting knowledge about the behaviour of the 
model/system studied, in other words, related to getting information about the 
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input-output relation. For examples, they could provide guidance as to where to 
improve the state of knowledge in order to reduce the output uncertainties most 
effectively, to steer research and development efforts, or better understand the 
modelling, or to obtain a good confidence in the results (potentially large 
uncertainties). Reference [63] is a good introduction to the different methods of 
SA and their use in industry. 
They may be divided into numerical and graphical techniques, and may in many 
cases be used simultaneously, using the same data set. There are many 
different SA techniques that may be divided according to different criteria. Let us 
divide them into the following types: 
 
• Regression based techniques; 
• Non parametric statistics used to identify relations between regions of 
input parameters and output variables; 
• Variance based techniques; 
• Distribution sensitivity techniques. 
 
All these methods are “complementary” and could be used according to the 
characteristics of the physical models and the statistics of interest. All these 
methods assume that the random input variables are statistically independent. 
 
7.4.1 Regression based techniques 
These techniques are based on using a sample (inputs plus outputs), obtained 
either by random sampling, or LHS or stratified sampling, though they could also 
be based on data obtained when applying design of experiments concepts, and 
try to identify if there is any linear, monotonic or polynomial, possibly considering 
also interactions, relation between inputs and outputs. Main tools are: 
 
• Pearson correlation coefficient, which identifies linear relations between 
one input parameter and one output variable; 
• Spearman rank correlation coefficient, which identifies monotonic relations 
between one input parameter and one output variable; 
• Partial correlation coefficients (PCC) and standardised regression 
coefficients (SRC), which identify linear relations between inputs and 
outputs taking into account the effect of correlation between inputs; 
• Partial rank correlation coefficients (PRCC) and standardised rank 
regression coefficients (SRRC), which identify monotonic relations 
between inputs and outputs taking into account the effect of rank 
correlation between inputs. 
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In all these cases, the validity of the indices obtained relies on the quality of the 
linear (or monotonic) approach adopted. If such hypothesis is not right, other 
more suitable techniques should be used. In the case of the PCCs and related 
statistic, a measure of the goodness of the linear (or monotonic) hypothesis is the 
coefficient of determination (R2). Coefficients of determination close to one 
indicate good global validity of the hypothesis, which means that the sensitivity 
indices are reliable in that case. Coefficients of determination close to zero 
indicate lack of validity of the hypotheses. 
 
7.4.2 Non-parametric statistics based techniques 
There are several statistics commonly used in data analysis that may be oriented 
to study specific relations between different regions of input parameters and 
output variable. In some cases, there is no clear trend in the behaviour of an 
output variable with respect to a given input parameter, but there could be some 
close relation between, for example, the 10% lowest observations of one of them 
and the 15% of largest observations of the other one. This kind of relation, under 
some circumstances could be not easy to be detected by regression-based 
techniques, while they are easily detected by non-parametric statistics. In what 
follows there is a list of those amongst the most useful: 
 
• Mann-Whitney test [63]; 
• Smirnov test [63]; 
• Kruskal-Wallis test [64]. 
 
7.4.3 Variance based techniques 
Variance decomposition for computer results is based on Sobol’s theorem [65] of 
decomposition or expansion of any integrable function )(xf  in the n-dimensional 
unit hypercube ( nK ). This expansion was named ‘expansion of a function into 
summands of different dimension’ or ‘High Dimensional Model Representation’ 
(HDMR) by its author. As a result of such decomposition, ways to estimate the 
contribution of main effects and interactions of different order may be studied. 
There are three well-known techniques to estimate those contributions to the 
global variability: 
 
• Correlation ratios [63]. This is the cheapest of these techniques in 
computational term, at least for models with many input parameters, but it 
allows to estimate only the contribution of main effects; 
• Sobol’s sensitivity indices [63]. This is the most expensive technique, but 
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allows to compute all the contributions; 
• Fourier Amplitude Sensitivity Test (FAST) [63]. 
 
7.5 Uncertainty combination 
Uncertainty evaluation has specific aspects if performed for a series of codes 
used in PSA, as it is usually the case. L2 PSA and L3 PSA use both results from 
the L1 PSA and, respectively L2 PSA combined with specific inputs for those 
steps in PSA evaluation, and also different codes combined between them. This 
can result in a more realistic situation defined in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1. Uncertainty calculations for the case of using different codes in PSA 
phases. 
 
It is assumed in this case that specific approaches for the evaluation of the total 
uncertainty are defined, as for instance in formula (4) below, in which a 
calculation of the output of L3 PSA is connected with the output from calculations 
for L1 PSA and uncertainties at each phase L2 PSA and L3 PSA: 
 
O3 + ∆U3 = O1+∆UTOT = O1+f(∆U1, ∆U2, ∆U3)                          (4) 
 
where f could be a combination (as for instance square root sum) of all the 
uncertainties from all levels of PSA. 
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8. PSA BASED & DETERMINISTIC NPP EZ 
8.1 Some General Aspects of PSA Application for EZ 
The use of PSA approach as a model and its methods, as included in the existing 
standard procedures and tasks already highlighted in previous chapters, is driven 
for any PSA application by a series of generic and specific aspects. In this 
section the main generic aspects having a high impact on the use of PSA for EZ 
are summarized. 
1. PSA goals and objectives – status and limitations 
The PSA objectives and context are of high impact for its use on any application, 
including for EZ. In [47; 49] a set of results for various risk metrics in PSA studies 
is presented for all the period since early 1980’s. These surveys and the 
information on PSA referred in previous chapters present the PSA studies status. 
PSA studies are performed for various objectives and goals and with various 
limitations. Their intended use for various applications is also very diverse.  
Therefore, for all those situations there are some limitations well known for PSA, 
which have a direct high impact if they are to be used for EZ application. Some of 
those limitations are as follows:  
• The environmental and demographic aspects have limitations for an 
individual country, but also could be evaluated diverse approaches in 
different countries, which for cross-border accidents pose a serious 
problem of initial common databases. 
• The calculations performed for a given plant have limitations and not yet 
commonly agreed approaches even if the question is about the same type 
of plant, as follows:  
o Environmental source term and emergency plan; 
o Approach to the consideration of core melt in shutdown states with 
open containment or containment bypass; 
o Modelling of high pressure core melt is considered; 
o Modelling of large early releases resulting from containment failure; 
o Modelling of the mitigation of low pressure core melt and vessel 
melt-through; 
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o Interface between non PSA approaches and other methods used 
for the identification of severe accidents from methodology and 
acceptance criteria point of view. 
• PSA technique issues in the use for EZ application require also evaluation 
of issues common to any approach in modelling severe accidents, as 
follows: 
o In-containment source term and radiological releases; 
o Reliability of passive systems; 
o Containment by-pass; 
o Hydrogen risk, 
o Assumptions on corium cooling; 
o In addition, some specific PSA type issues are to be solved, too, as 
for instance: 
 Definition of the PSA level and hence the risk metrics to be 
used; 
 Definition of scenarios and their evaluation in separate 
calculations; 
 Qualification of systems for severe accidents; 
 Requirements to probabilistic and risk metrics in the given 
regulatory environment. 
 
In this context it is important to mention that the objectives of PSA, for instance of 
level 2, as described in [49] and which have previously been mentioned in 
section 5.4 of this report, will not change if they are to be used for EZ application. 
 
2. PSA metrics 
As it was shown in the previous paragraph, the present status of PSA and hence 
the level of PSA performed are expected to have an important impact on the EZ 
application. The existing situation of PSA studies is summarized in [49] for the 
whole period since PSA started to be developed. As it is shown in Figure 8.1, 
there was a continuous change of requirements to risk analysis and thus a 
certain evolution of risk metrics can be noticed. By risk metrics it is understood 
further mainly CDF (as the main result from L1 PSA ), LERF (as the main result 
from L2 PSA) and risk (as the main result from L3 PSA ). 
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Figure 8.1. Sample representation based on PSA published results [49] of the 
evolution of risk metrics. 
Figure 8.1 is a sample representation of the evolution of risk metrics during the 
years (split into 7 periods since 1980 by now) as results from the PSA published 
results [49]. The evaluation of the level of requirements is done in a qualitative 
manner as represented on the vertical axis. The results show the possibility 
during all the periods to use various risk metrics in order to define requirements 
and targets for PSA analyses and their use. 
However, if it is possible to have a choice on which risk metrics to use, it is also 
important to consider the fact (as shown later in this chapter) that the risk metric 
should be preferred. 
The probabilistic criteria in the sense of probabilistic targets, which are defined in 
INSAG 3 (shown in comparison with the PSA studies published results in Figure 
8.1) requirements are set for the risk metrics so that : 
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• The cumulated frequency CDF leading to a core melt has to be kept below 
10-5 per reactor year for all plant states, considering internal as well as 
external events; 
• The cumulated frequency of sequences leading to unacceptable releases 
(i.e. in excess of maximum allowable releases for design extension 
conditions) has to be kept below 10-6 per reactor year; 
• The cumulated frequency of sequences leading to early containment 
failure or to very large releases – LERF has to be kept below 10-7 per 
reactor year. 
In some specific cases [53] a set of risk based criteria are set by the regulatory 
environment and this is illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Risk levels for individuals in a Critically Exposed Group [53]. 
 
For all the world regions preparing for next generations of NPP it is expected to 
see a general move towards more intensive use of the risk as a risk metric for all 
NPP aspects and applications. In this context, for instance in USA expected 
future developments are (as shown in [48]) to move to the use of safety goals 
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including Quantitative Health Objectives, which require a more extensive use of 
risk for all NPP aspects including specific applications of PSA. It is expected to 
have this evolution as part of the existing risk informed regulatory environment.  
In some cases foreseen for future requirements, in Europe (like in EUR 
requirements case illustrated in more details in section 5.3 of this report) the use 
of risk targets and much stronger other risk metrics is expected to lead to no 
needs for expected EZ. However, this still definitely will be a matter of future 
analysis and clarification. 
The clarifications and refinements for decisions on EZ radii are needed for 
various situations and aspects to be considered, as follows: 
• The requirements for new reactors built at new sites; 
• The requirements for new reactors built at old sites, close to other reactors 
of old generations, for which the EZ radii have already been defined; 
• The requirements for new NPP with multiple units at the same site; 
• The agreed policies for EZ of NPP (new and/or old) in areas affecting 
more than one country. 
 
8.2 Some Specific Aspects of PSA Application for EZ 
Assuming that the generic aspects of PSA procedures are considered as 
discussed above and illustrated in previous chapters, then the next step in the 
use of PSA for EZ application is to define how specific tasks of PSA level 1, 2 
and/or 3 are applicable and which are the differences (if any).  
In this section it is considered that, in principle, the tasks of PSA are applied as 
defined by standards for each level of PSA without modifications in order to use 
them in EZ application.  
However, some of the tasks need either special attention or some modifications 
for such a case. The next part presents those specific aspects for the tasks, 
which are considered to be of higher impact for EZ applications and also some 
details on how some of the tasks in PSA have to be performed. 
The tasks will be coded as Task PSA_EX_X. The coding is used in order to 
underline the tasks which are important and to which more attention should be 
devoted. 
There are also some references not only to NPP of generation II+ and III, but 
also to generation IV. 
PSA starts by considering diverse and all sources of radiation and all scenarios 
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challenging them, and therefore, it is highly suitable for EZ application. The 
results and insights from L2 PSA, in the format of LERF calculations based on 
various scenarios combined between L1 and L2 PSA in a process called 
“binning”, which is presented at PSA_EZ_1 below, lead to a conservative 
envelope of the EZ parameters. 
This process is possible by application of the PSA procedure, which combines 
inputs from source term evaluation with containment impact - in event trees for 
containment, CETs, and by including results on phenomenological evolution of 
various scenarios calculated in the severe accidents codes, as it was described 
in previous chapters. 
In fulfilling all below tasks for EZ application, no major change from standard 
procedures is expected. On the contrary, it is expected that the PSA approach of 
addressing all scenarios and challenges might be highly beneficial, providing 
more conservatism in comparison with the deterministic evaluations. 
The logic of combining initiating scenarios and end states of containment and the 
final proposal of source terms might be the most important specific set of tasks 
from L2 PSA, making the difference between the deterministic and probabilistic 
approaches in EZ application.  
Task PSA_EZ_1: Source Terms Evaluation  
The identification of radioactive sources, of the timing of the release, of the 
quantity and chemical form of radioactivity released and the modelling of 
dispersion inside containment is a very important part requiring special 
calculations. In case of this EZ task a special attention is allocated to the choice 
of the source of radiation and the scenarios postulated. The PSA approach could 
bring, as a new part in this task, the possibility to evaluate more comprehensively 
all the range of initiating events (as postulated in PSA) and also to perform a 
series of severe accident calculations to define and refine the source term parts. 
Task PSA_EZ_2: Sensitivity and uncertainty (S&U) analyses in L2 PSA 
methodology 
The S&U analyses might be the next significant specific set of tasks from L2 PSA 
of high importance for the EZ application. This is due to how the following items 
are performed: 
• Definition of PDSs; 
• Number of nodes and endpoints defined in the containment event trees; 
• Number of source terms and release categories defined;  
• The assumptions resulted from the phenomenological codes runs;  
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• The independent alternative approaches are used in severe accident 
analyses; 
• The independent alternatives perform a correlation between the 
probabilistic and deterministic descriptions;  
• The S&U are actually performed. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_3: Definition of the plant damage states  
Definition of fault sequences that lead to core damage, which are identified in L1 
PSA are taken forward into the L2 PSA. The  groups obtained, called plant 
damage states (PDS), are defined in terms of the attributes that would influence 
the way that the accident progresses to challenge the containment integrity and 
to release of radioactive material to the environment. The PDS attributes are 
specific to the type of reactors (PWR, BWR, heavy water channel type, etc.) as 
well as also for gas reactors. For generation IV gas reactors, for which there is no 
sense to consider core damage, but only release categories (RC), binning 
process is of much higher importance than for LWR. Things are also more 
sensitive to systematic errors for channel reactors.  
The binning rules and results of the binning for PDS are of high importance and 
need to be subject to careful and independent reviews in order to assure 
accurate L2 PSA results. 
Task PSA_EZ_4: Accident progression analysis 
This L2 PSA task model the progression of the accident from core damage to the 
challenges to the containment and the subsequent release of radioactive material 
for each of the PDSs by using an event tree approach in the format of CETs or 
APETs. These event trees need to model all the significant physical and 
chemical processes, which might be actually the source of potential important 
systematic modelling errors. Those event trees require also inputs from 
specialized codes calculations. For the generation IV gas reactors with 
confinements the release categories defined for the CET are of special 
importance. 
The latest developments in PSA technique also take the advantage of integrated 
PSA models (including internal and external events, all modes of operation PSA 
models in one unitary model). This is of special help for the performance of 
intensive sensitivity calculations, which are considered in order to evaluate the 
impact of the modelling aspects on the results.  
 
Task PSA_EZ_5: Severe accident modelling 
The tasks of L2 PSA related to severe accident modelling are considered also to 
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be subject of intensive review and check. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
physical and chemical processes that are expected to occur during severe 
accidents typically involve many simultaneous phenomenological interactions for 
which detailed experimental information may be sparse or not available and 
therefore they use mathematical and computer simulation. For the generation IV 
reactors this is of one of the highest priorities. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_6: Containment performance analysis 
L2 PSA quality and accuracy of results potentially to be used in EZ applications 
depends on the containment performance analysis. For the water reactors of 
generation II+ and III, a series of containment integrity issues were identified 
during the experience accumulated so far and they could be found in [47, 49]. 
Mechanisms challenging the containment function and the containment failure 
modes were extensively illustrated in previous section 5.4 and in Table 5.4. 
Typical gas reactor confinement has, however, other problems and the whole 
mechanism is different. An illustration of such a confinement is shown in [52]. 
The difference is given by the energies of the released gas, the radioactivity 
carried away, and the timing, which have very high impact on severe accident 
concepts and the definition of EZ. Nevertheless, the process required by this task 
is the same as the similar L2 PSA task, performed not for EZ application.  
 
Task PSA_EZ_7: Quantification of L2 PSA model 
The tasks of quantification in all PSA levels, including L2 PSA are important and 
related to the accuracy of the models, which are built using various software 
codes. The PSA models include also assumptions and interface with results from 
deterministic analyses. The quantification of the frequency of the various 
sequences from the containment event trees uses the data on frequencies of the 
PDSs, derived from the L1 PSA, and the conditional probabilities of the event 
trees. These probabilities include failure of safety systems such as the 
containment spray system (quantified also using fault trees) structural failures of 
the containment (quantified using a model of the performance of the structure), 
and the occurrence of physical phenomena where the split fractions relate to the 
analyst’s evaluation. For the split fractions the numerical values are derived from 
judgment supported by available sources of information.  
After obtaining frequencies for PDS, fatalities are calculated for each release 
category (in case of generation IV gas reactors), or for PDS (for the water 
reactors) as shown in Figure 8.3. The results of L2 PSA are then post processed 
and used for PSA applications as licensing or EZ in the form of fatalities. 
 
Figure 8.3. Sample representation of the calculation of fatalities and risks for each distance level. 
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It is important to mention that in Figure 8.3 the summary table for all the 
release categories and the total fatalities for all distances are already summed 
and normalized for the risk metric of L3 PSA, because the example is actually 
illustrating such a case. 
Task PSA_EZ_8: Use of computer codes and various models 
A significant set of problems has to be solved for new applications in PSA for 
the computer codes used. The situation is increasingly complicated from L1 to 
L3 PSA due to the fact that more advanced and higher level codes are used 
and coupled, that results in dependency of their interface on connecting 
assumptions. 
A special category represents the separate phenomena codes for L2 PSA, 
which are basically of two groups as it was mentioned in section 6.1 of this 
report. 
For each of those codes extensive verification and validation (V&V) was 
performed for water reactors. Some examples of the V&V actions for MAAP 
codes are presented in [47, 49] Though for those codes their V&V process is 
very important, the most important aspect for PSA calculations is to be able to 
define and perform V&V for all the PSA flow path of the calculations using 
diverse codes.  
As it was shown in [52], in case of performing such calculations for a 
generation IV gas NPP, there are some very important aspects to mention: 
• The error evaluation and uncertainty calculations should consider the 
fact that a set of codes are used for the full L3 PSA calculation; 
• It was established that some diffusion codes have an error variation 
with the distance from the source (i. e NPP in EZ application); 
• Many phenomenological codes are providing results with their own 
uncertainties and limitations, which have to be considered while being 
prepared as inputs to other codes; 
• There is a need to define a procedure for uncertainty calculation of the 
whole calculation flow path for the risk metrics adopted in the EZ 
application. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_9: L3 PSA process 
In the L3 PSA, a large number of CET end-points are grouped to provide the 
interface between the L2 PSA and L3 PSA consequence analyses. This 
grouping and classification for L2 PSA and L3 PSA interfaces is called also 
“binning”, like the similar action between L1 PSA and L2 PSA. This subtask is 
of utmost importance for the PSA results and subject to extensive sensitivity 
analyses. 
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The flow path of L3 PSA as shown in [52] in a format of a series of code 
calculations and other assumptions, and this aspect is not usually mentioned. 
However, the definition of the calculation sequences and the codes to be used 
is one of the most important in order to obtain the risk metrics. The results are 
presented usually in risk metrics (risk for instance) and its uncertainty band. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_10: Use of results and various risk metrics  
PSA results are mainly in a form of risk metrics. As it was shown previously in 
Figure 8.1, there was a certain development of risk metrics requirements 
during the years. One reason for that is that not all the PSA like risk metrics 
are suitable for decision making process of many PSA applications.  
This statement is fully applicable for EZ, for which the use of CDF is the less 
desirable and adequate and the use of risk is the best option. This is also 
illustrated by the latest developments as shown for a case of using L3 PSA in 
applications similar to EZ [50].  
In this case the risk metrics are represented in early fatalities/year, early 
injuries/ year, latent fatalities/year, thyroid cancer/year, whole-body person-
rem/year, based on a series of sensitivity calculations to derive the envelope 
of the EZ parameters. 
PSA calculations are done so that they lead to a reasonable envelope of the 
risk metrics of various scenarios and this is the main difference from 
deterministic calculations valid also for EZ applications of PSA. The risk 
metrics are then represented with the range of their variation for all scenarios 
[52] for any type of NPP, including generation IV ones, as illustrated in Figure 
8.4. 
If the dependence of the risk metrics of a large set of parameters is 
considered, then one can actually obtain a set of acceptable risk surfaces as 
shown in Figure 8.6.  
To conclude on the use of various risk metrics, Figure 8.4 shows that the 
applicability of L3 PSA risk metrics to NPP EZ is much better than L2 PSA, 
while L1 PSA risk metrics is not expected to be of some help for the definition 
of EZ.  
 
8.3 Evaluation of PSA Results for EZ  
PSA results for risk metrics as decided by the analysts (but considering the 
limitations mentioned above) can be used in order to evaluate parameters 
important to EZ like for instance PAZ and UPZ. 
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Figure 8.4. Sample representations of the PSA risk metrics limitations for the 
EZ application use. 
 
Since PAZ and UPZ should be roughly circular areas around the facility, the 
results should be represented in a corresponding format. The PSA 
calculations are practically able to evaluate suggested PAZ and UPZ radii. 
Task PSA_EZ_11: Use of PSA results for defining NPP EZ 
PSA application for EZ includes the modelled barriers and scenarios aspects, 
common in nuclear safety for any kind of analyses (deterministic or 
probabilistic) as for instance DBA, BDBA, SA, fission product characteristics, 
meteorological considerations, exposure pathways, adverse health effects, 
and avoiding adverse health effects.  
PSA performs evaluation of risk metrics considering all those aspects but 
using the strengths of the PSA method able to derive an envelope of all the 
challenges to the installation (initiating events) in one single unitary and 
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systematic approach. However, there are limitations due to PSA performance 
and methodology, specific to each country and group of users, which could 
produce supplementary difficulties in the interpretation of PSA results for 
applications like EZ. For example, grouping of NPP events including accidents by 
frequency of their occurrence differs in different countries.  
Nevertheless, as shown in Figures 8.5, 8.8 and 8.9, the expected PAZ and UPZ 
are distributed within a range of values. In order to decide on the final values, 
more information is needed to be available for the decision makers.  
It can be also mentioned, as shown in [52] that practically there is no expected 
fundamental difference for the calculations of EZ parameters of radii in case of a 
gas NPP of generation IV in comparison with a water reactor NPP. This is true 
even if decision on whether to have or not PAZ/UPZ and which are to be their 
magnitudes is still a debated issue. 
For the sake of underlying the computational aspects of the radii in a 
deterministic like approach versus a probabilistic like approach, a set of simplified 
(but not superficial) formulas can be derived as per (1) to (3): 
Radd = Sd * R d * C d  *  Diff d   *  D d  +/-  ∆Ud                                  (1) 
Radp = Sp * R p * C p  *  Diff p   *  D p   =                          (2) 
≅Sd* R d* C d * Diff d *D d *  ∫ f1(Sp) *f2(R p )* f3(C p ) * f4(Diff p ) * f5(D p )dx +/-   ∆Up    
 
Radp ≅ Radd  *F1(Sp)*F2(R p )*F3(C p) *F4(Diff p ) *F5(D p ) +/- ∆U        (3) 
 
Where  
Sd     Source term in deterministic approach 
R
 d  Reactor failure criterion in deterministic approach 
C
 d   Containment failure criterion in deterministic approach  
Diff
 d  Diffusion criterion in deterministic approach 
D
 d  Fatalities criterion in deterministic approach                                       
Sp  Source term in probabilistic approach 
R
 p  Reactor failure criterion in probabilistic approach 
C
 p  Containment failure criterion in probabilistic approach 
Diffp Diffusion criterion in probabilistic approach 
D
 p  Fatalities criterion in probabilistic approach    
∆U d,p   Uncertainties in deterministic, respectively probabilistic calculations 
∆U    Final total uncertainties  
f1(Sp), f2(R p ), f3(C p ), f4(Diff p ),  f5(D p )   Distribution functions for the 
probabilistic criteria 
FTOTAL   Convolution of f1 to f5. 
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5 UPZL_
50D1 
UPZU_5
0F1 
UPZBE_
50D7 
UPZEXU_5
0F7 
PAZEXL
_500D1 
PAZBE_
500F1 
PAZL_50
0D7 
PAZU_5
00F7 
 
Table 8.1. Codes for the EZ calculations in Figure 8.5. 
 
For the cases represented in Table 8.1, a representation of PAZ and UPZ is 
shown in Figure 8.5. 
The calculations from probabilistic point of view require combination of all the 
probabilistic criteria distributions, which is done by calculating convolution 
integral as shown in Figure 8.6. 
If the calculations have been performed for generation IV reactors, then there are 
not expected any changes in the type of results. 
Final results of L1, L2, or L3 PSA are actually represented by a set of surfaces 
within a certain error band, as a function of the probabilities of events and 
parameters governing the model, as shown in Figure 8.7. 
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Figure 8.5. Sample representation of the PSA risk metrics limitations for     
the EZ application  
 
After performing those calculations, the results are obtained in the form from (4) 
with some uncertainty band and a certain connection with the expected 
deterministic like result: 
Radp ≅ Radd  * FTOTAL +/- ∆U                     (4) 
The calculation of the convolution integral is embedded in the PSA codes 
calculation and the flow of calculation was already shown in [52]. The formulas 
shown above are illustrating the fact that there is a traceable connection between 
the deterministic type of results and the probabilistic/risk metrics ones. 
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Figure 8.6. Sample representation of the calculation of convolution 
integral and the surface of risk results generated in L3 PSA.  
 
Figure 8.7. Sample representations of the calculation of convolution integral and 
the surface of risk results generated in a L3 PSA.  
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8.4 Conclusions & Comments to the Discussed Specific 
Aspects  
In the previous paragraphs there were illustrated some specific aspects and 
details of implementing PSA for EZ application, including some samples of PSA 
practical results. However, it is of the highest importance to mention that 
obtaining risk metrics based EZ parameters does not constitute the end of the EZ 
application in PSA approach. 
On the contrary, if the PSA based results are not using a specific approach in 
reasoning, which is called “risk informed decision making” (RIDM), then the 
conclusions could be fundamentally wrong. In order to apply RIDM one has to 
use logical connectors between deterministic (D) probabilistic (P) interface (F) 
and correlation statements (Rg) to be included in a set of decision tables  
The decisions should consider the fact, that deterministic and probabilistic areas 
for their inherent best applications are different. 
The important aspects to be noted in relation to the use of PSA like results in the 
decision making process based on the use of decision tables is (as shown in 
[52]) that it is highly recommended to use a risk informed type of approach in 
formulating the final decision. This is due to the fact that risk results require 
probabilistic type of inferences in the judgements to build decision tables. This 
involves also a very clear description of the limits and strengths of deterministic 
and probabilistic results for EZ parameters. 
Based on the results of combination of various approaches (optimistic, 
pessimistic, etc.) using insights from all methods, i.e. deterministic and 
probabilistic, a decision on the EZ parameters can be taken.  
To summarize, it is highly recommended or even necessary to consider 
deterministic and probabilistic approaches being complementary. 
An example of formulation of results interpretation of the EZ parameters by using 
different approaches, i.e. deterministic and probabilistic, and for various events 
and for various risk zones could be as follows [54]: 
• If the decision is aimed at evaluating high foreseen risk situations above 
the acceptable limits, then the deterministic pessimistic statements may 
lead to the most conservative decision, even if that happens under less 
credibility than for the probabilistic ones. On the other hand, due to other 
reasons than technical ones, the deterministic based decisions could be 
expected.  
• If the decision is aimed at evaluating high or moderate foreseen risk 
situations below the acceptable limits, then there is no difference between 
the very pessimistic way of thinking and optimistic one, or a probabilistic 
one. However, there is an exception based on the fact, that the 
probabilistic evaluation has more credibility, which could make it the best 
option to choose for the decision.  
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• If the decision is aimed at evaluating low and very low foreseen risk 
situations below the acceptable limits, then it may be based on the 
probabilistic approach, giving the fact that it generates the most 
conservative results with highest credibility. Evaluation of risk impact using 
extensive sensitivity cases is one of the key issues to support the 
probabilistic type of thinking and its more extensive use in decision making 
process. This is integrated in the verification and validation process, of 
which independent review and benchmarking play a very important role in 
confirming the truth value of probabilistic statements.  
In a geometric representation that means, that the EZ radii could be illustrated as 
a set of spectrum available values from low bound to upper bound with a certain 
best estimate set of values, as shown in Figures 8.8 and 8.9. 
 
 
Figure 8.8. Sample representations of the EZ radiuses calculated based on PSA 
sensitivity analyses.  
The last very important point of the performed evaluations is related to EZ 
parameters of multiple NPP units from various generations on the same site, as 
shown in Figure 8.10. 
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Figure 8.9. Sample representations of the EZ radiuses calculated based on PSA 
sensitivity analyses.  
As a conclusion on the practical aspects of using PSA results for EZ application, 
it is considered a highly recommended approach that the evaluations performed 
using deterministic and probabilistic analyses have to be considered 
complementary, given the strengths and limits of each of them. 
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Figure 8.10. Sample representations of the EZ radiuses calculated based on 
PSA for a plant site with multiple NPP units [52]. 
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9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
One of the key challenges in dependable RIDM is the reconciliation of PSA 
results and insights with traditional deterministic safety analysis. This is 
particularly true when it comes to defense in depth and safety margins. PSA 
results may and often conflict with deterministic insights. If a method of 
reconciling these conflicts is not defined, then RIDM can become deterministic 
assessment, along with PSA. This results in PSA being an additional layer of 
requirements rather than a tool for optimised decision making [39].  
Within this report, an attempt to reach a balanced approach, using PSA 
technology as a complementary tool has been done and illustrated on some 
specific examples, resulting in the realistic, feasible outcome from NPP 
emergency zoning practice. There is a general agreement that RIDM has the 
potential to contribute towards maintaining and improving nuclear safety. It can 
complement the deterministic approach to nuclear safety and maintain the 
concepts of defence in depth and adequate safety margins. However, RIDM is 
broader concept than just the use of PSA in NPP applications. RIDM uses the 
results of PSA as one input to the decision making process, but allows for 
consideration of other factors, in particular aspects of safety management and 
safety culture. At present these aspects are included in PSA only to the extent 
that they are reflected in the plant-specific data used, but they are not explicitly 
modelled in PSA [40]. RIDM in NPP emergency zoning is a process, which can 
be used by the utility and the regulator, and provides the framework for risk 
informed regulation in this area. The objective should be to enhance regulatory 
effectiveness, using risk information to optimise nuclear safety regulation.  
Whether risk informed regulation is of benefit to utilities depends to a large extent 
on the common understanding developed with the regulatory authorities. Since 
the preparation of a PSA imposes a considerable burden in terms of the human 
and financial resources that need to be expended, it is of utmost importance to 
define clearly what is expected from the utility and how the results will be used. 
This common understanding can be developed in a dialogue that includes all 
stakeholders. RIDM would strengthen the perception that the operator is 
assuming the primary responsibility for safe operation.  
RIDM in areas that affect licensee requirements necessitates review (and, 
ultimately, approval) of PSA and supporting information by the regulatory body. A 
suitable regulatory framework and regulatory staff with considerable technical 
capabilities in the areas of PSA and risk informed decision making are 
prerequisites for such review and approval. This constitutes a considerable 
burden for countries with small nuclear programmes and limited numbers of 
regulatory staff [40].  
It is necessary to ensure the availability of high quality PSA to support RIDM. The 
meaning of “high quality” in this context can vary and is defined as being 
commensurate with the intended use. Several IAEA as well as EU Member 
States have developed national PSA guidelines, and the IAEA has prepared 
guidance on PSA quality for applications in NPP at the international level [41]. 
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The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) has developed a 
standard on PSA [28, 42]. Additional efforts to promote the production of high 
quality PSA include peer reviews, establishment of user groups for similar type of 
plants, pooling of data and preparation of reference PSA [40]. RIDM in NPP 
emergency zoning can be successful - like in other areas - only if all 
stakeholders understand the process and the results obtained.  
In addition to the main nuclear regulatory body, a licensee has to deal with 
several other regulatory organizations, e.g. those responsible for environmental 
protection. If the concept of RIDM in NPP emergency zoning is not shared by 
these other authorities, this might complicate the decision making process. Thus, 
consistency between the approaches followed by different authorities would be 
beneficial.  
Owing to the state-of-the-art understanding and increased characterisation of 
NPP severe accidents as well as advanced understanding of PSA technology, 
which can be currently considered mature enough, overall management of NPP 
severe accidents could be – and also should be - analysed as an integrated 
complex process. The interrelationship of NPP emergency operating procedures, 
safety and risk assessments, severe accident management guidelines, and 
emergency off-site actions should be planned and organized to minimize the 
consequences of such accidents. This approach might be a contribution to 
ensure the continued safety of NPPs and to improve effectiveness of regulatory 
practices in EU Member States.  
As the transition to risk informed regulation is taking place gradually more or 
less worldwide, activities conducted within this project represent comprehensive 
application of PSA technology to contribute to NPP emergency zoning issues.  
This report indicates clearly that the current, state-of-the-art PSA technology is 
significantly able to contribute – as a complementary tool - to the traditional 
engineering, deterministic approach to addressing various issues of NPP 
emergency planning practices, especially emergency zoning and might be highly 
topical at present in terms of regulatory effectiveness in EU Member States. 
And finally, there is one more facet of the subject matter: some safety 
consequences resulting from economic pressure on NPP operators as a result of 
deregulation of electricity markets. Although deregulation is not the only reason 
why nuclear operators have intensified their efforts to reduce costs and become 
more efficient, it is clear that the industry is changing and that regulators must 
prepare for this new situation. This report would not like to give outright advice 
regarding any prioritising. This must follow from the assessment of the national 
situation in each EU Member State. The authors of this report hope that it will 
be of some help in this assessment and in thorough consideration to the subject. 
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APPENDIX  A 
Re-evaluation of EPZ for Chinshan NPP in Taiwan 
This section provides a summary of the NPP EPZ defining practice as applied in 
Taiwan. The information used in this Appendix A has directly been taken and 
adapted from ELSEVIER publication Applied Radiation and Isotopes 64 (2006) 
[43] 36, because it provides a very good and informative example of practical use 
of risk informed approach in support of NPP emergency zoning. 
According to the government regulations, the EPZ of a NPP in Taiwan must be 
defined before operation and re-evaluated every 5 years. Corresponding 
emergency response planning (ERP) has to be made in advance to guarantee 
that all necessary resources are available under accidental releases of 
radioisotopes. In that study [43], the EPZ for each of the three operating NPPs, 
Chinshan, Kuosheng, and Maanshan in Taiwan was re-evaluated using the 
MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System 2 (MACCS2) developed by 
Sandia National Laboratory. Meteorological data around the nuclear power plant 
were collected during 2003. The source term data including inventory, sensible 
heat content, and timing duration, were based on previous PSA information of 
each plant. The effective dose equivalent and thyroid dose together with the 
related individual risk and societal risk were calculated. 
An EPZ is considered the area where actions should be taken first to protect the 
general public when a nuclear accident occurs. The corresponding ERP in the 
EPZ, therefore, has to be made in advance to ensure that all necessary 
resources are available to protect the population from radiation exposure. 
According to the government regulations revised in March 2005 in Taiwan, the 
EPZ of a NPP must be specified again and re-evaluated every 5 years according 
to the latest environmental data. Therefore, the EPZs of the three existing NPPs 
had to be re-evaluated. 
The previous, original EPZ results37 obtained for these three operating NPPs 
using the CRAC238 code were less than 5.0 km radius (3.6, 4.6, and 4.4 km, 
respectively). Therefore, the government set an EPZ of 5.0 km radius for all three 
plants. Afterwards, in due time, it was necessary to re-evaluate the EPZ for each 
plant using the MACCS2 code with the updated population distribution and 
meteorological data to fulfil the revised regulations. The effective dose equivalent 
and thyroid dose together with the individual risk and societal risk for each 
                                                 
36 www.elsevier.com/locate/apradiso 
37
 Yin, H. L.: CRAC2 evaluation of emergency planning zone for Kuosheng nuclear power plant; 
Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, INER-T1784, 1993; for Chinshan and Maanshan NPPs in 
analogous report of Chen et all., 1992 in 1992. 
38
 Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences Code (CRAC) was developed in support of 
Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400, US NRC, 1975. The updated version, which was released in 
1982 incorporated major improvements over the CRAC in terms of weather sequence sampling 
and emergency response modelling (Ritche, L. T., Jonson, J. D., Blond, R. M.: Calculation of 
reactor accident consequences version 2 CRAC computer code user’s guide. Sandia National 
Laboratories, NUREG/CR-2326). 
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category of accidents were evaluated and then weighted to achieve the final 
outcome. By comparing the results with the Protective Action Guide (PAG)39 and 
the related criteria, a reasonable conservative EPZ was proposed for each plant. 
The MACCS2 code was used to estimate radiological doses, health effects, and 
economic consequences that could result from accidental releases of radioactive 
materials to the atmosphere. The treated phenomena consist of building wake 
effects, buoyant plume rise, plume dispersion during transport (Pasquill-Gifford 
dispersion parameters), wet and dry deposition, and radioactive decay and in-
growth. Two kinds of doses were calculated: acute dose used for the estimates 
of early fatalities and injuries, and lifetime dose commitment used for the 
estimates of associated excess cancer risks resulting from early exposure. The 
dose calculation for each exposure pathway is spatially variant and is the product 
of the following quantities: radionuclide concentration, dose conversion factors, 
duration of exposure, and shielding factors. Evacuation, sheltering, and 
relocation could have been chosen as the protective actions in this calculation 
module, but none of them was specified because the most conservative results 
were required. 
The calculations pertaining to the intermediate and long-term phases were also 
performed. The associated exposure pathways during the intermediate phase 
are groundshine and resuspension inhalation, and the pathways during the long-
term phase are groundshine as well as food and water ingestion. A polar-
coordinate grid divided into 16 compass directions with an angle of 22.5° each is 
centred at the location of the release. The results outputted from the MACCS2 
are stored subsequently on the basis of this spatial grid system. Fig. A.1 shows 
the polar coordinate system built in the MACCS2 code and the numbering 
system associated with 16 compass directions. 
To evaluate the EPZ, some specific data, such as source terms, meteorological 
data, and population distribution were required. The source terms used in the re-
evaluation were identical to those used in the former evaluation using the CRAC2 
code in 1992 – 93, based on the preliminary design of the facility. For example, 
Table A.I shows a sample of some important parameters associated with 15 
release categories for the Chinshan NPP (2 x BWR 600 MWe), Table A.II shows 
a sample of the inventory of 60 radionuclides contained in that facility, and Table 
A.III shows a sample of the release fractions of nine radionuclide groups of the 
60 radionuclides for each release category. The hourly meteorological data, 
including wind direction, velocity, and stability, were collected at the weather 
tower inside each plant during 2003. 
Dose conversion factors (DCFs) of the 60 radionuclides considered important for 
NPP releases were required as input data for the MACCS2 code. For the 
exposure pathways of cloudshine and groundshine, the DCFs were extracted 
from the database of ICRP40, and for the pathways of inhalation and ingestion 
                                                 
39 There was not a reference found; however, obviously it is a regulation or a legislative 
document in Taiwan. 
40
 Radionuclide transformations; energy and intensity of emissions. ICRP Publication 38, Annals 
of the ICRP vol. 11-13 
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the DCFs were adopted from the Federal Guidance Reports 1141 and 1242. 
                
Fig. A.1. The polar coordinate and the numbering system associated with 16 
compass directions built in the MACCS2 code. 
The MACCS2 code itself is only a consequence modelling code. For the purpose 
of EPZ calculation, some safety criteria should be provided as a reference to 
achieve conservative and reasonable results. According to the relevant 
regulations, the following four guidelines were proposed as the basis: 
• The risk of prompt fatality to an individual or to the population in the 
vicinity of a NPP that might result from reactor accidents should not 
exceed 0.1% of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from all other 
causes. 
• The risk of cancer fatality to an individual or to the population in the vicinity 
of a NPP that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed 0.1% 
of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes. 
• The anticipated whole body dose and thyroid dose beyond the EPZ should 
not exceed the national Protective Action Guide levels in the design basis 
accidents and most of the core-melt accidents. 
• There is no prompt fatality beyond the EPZ even if the most severe 
                                                 
41
 Eckerman, K.F., Wolbarst, A.B., Richardson, A.C.B., 1988. Limiting values of radionuclide 
intake and air concentration and dose conversion factors for inhalation, submersion, and 
ingestion. Federal Guidance Report 11, DE89-011065. 
42
  Eckerman, K.F., Ryman, J.C., 1993. External exposure to radionuclides in air, water, and soil. 
Federal Guidance Report 12, PB94-114451. 
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accident occurs. 
 
Release 
Category 
Frequency     
  [year-1] 
TTRAR     
   [h] 
Release 
duration      
[h]   
TTPN 
   [h] 
Heat rate  
[cal x s-1] 
Release 
height     
[m] 
1 2.00 x 10-6 6.97 48.00 9.54 1.80 x 107 240. 00 
2 7.60 x 10-9 0.07 0.83 0.70 7.20 x 106 29. 80 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
14 1.60 x 10-6 1. 06 1. 50 1. 32 8.60 x 105 29. 80 
15 1.90 x 10-8 0. 26 1. 07 0. 67 4.10 x 106 29. 80 
TTRAR: Time between reactor shutdown and radioactive material release [h].                       
TTPN: Time between notification of the public and release [h]. 
Table A.I. Sample of important parameters associated with 15 release categories 
for Chinshan NPP. 
 
According to the above guidelines and the prompt and cancer fatality data 
collected from other accidents in Taiwan, the safety criteria for calculating the 
boundary of an EPZ can be derived as follows: 
• The individual risk < 6.41 x 10-7 per year; 
• The societal risk43 < 2.18 x 10-6 per year; 
• The frequency of the whole body dose exceeding 0.1 Sv < 3.0 x 10-5 per 
year; 
• The frequency of the thyroid dose exceeding 1.0 Sv < 3.0 x 10-5 per year; 
• The frequency of the whole body dose exceeding 2.0 Sv (prompt fatality 
dose) < 3.0 x 10-6 per year. 
                                                 
43
 The societal risk is the ratio of latent cancer fatality (expected fatal cancers) to total population 
within the radius. 
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Number Isotope Group Inventory [Bq] 
1 Co-58 6 1. 005 x 1016 
9 Sr-90 5 1. 289 x 1017 
16 Zr-95 7 2. 926 x 1018 
29 Te-129 4 4. 976 x 1017 
33 I-131 2 1. 695 x 1018 
38 Xe-133 1 3. 563 x 1018 
40 Cs-134 3 2. 777 x 1017 
44 Ba-140 9 3. 236 x 1018 
48 Ce-141 8 2. 939 x 1018 
60 Cm-244 7 2. 052 x 1015 
Table A.II. Sample of the inventory of 60 radionuclides contained in Chinshan NPP. 
By comparing the consequences of individual risk, societal risk, whole body 
dose, and thyroid dose versus distance to the corresponding safety criteria listed 
above, a reasonably conservative suggestion for the EPZ of each of the three 
NPPs could be proposed. 
Using the MACCS2 code, the radiological doses and the associated risks that 
could result from each postulated accidental release category were calculated 
The consequences were then summed up by the probability weighting factor44 of 
each category. The complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF)45 
was used to estimate the probability of exceeding the safety criteria. Fig. A.2 
plots the CCDFs of whole body dose of 0.1 Sv, whole body dose of 2.0 Sv, and 
thyroid dose of 1.0 Sv versus distance from the release site. 
                                                 
44
 A multiplier that is used for converting the equivalent dose to a specific organ or tissue into 
what is called the “effective dose.” The goal is to express the dose to a portion of the body in 
terms of an equivalent dose to the whole body that would carry with it an equivalent risk in terms 
of the associated fatal cancer probability. It applies only to the stochastic effects of radiation; see 
e.g. http://hps.org/publicinformation/radterms/radfact153.html 
45
 In risk assessment it addresses "the exceedance question." It is the probability that the release 
will exceed a certain value. This question can be answered by a summing, or integration 
operation, on the probability density function (Figure B.1[b]). The result of such a summation is 
called the cumulative distribution function. The complement-that is, one minus the parameter 
(here, the cumulative probability)-and the log-log scale are the additional steps taken to achieve 
the desired form (Figures B.1[c] and [d]). These steps result in a compact form for representing 
parameters that cover an extremely wide range of values; see e.g. 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=5269&page=111 
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Group »» » 
 
 
 
 
Category 
1 
Xe - Kr 
2 
I - Br 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
3: Cs-Rb 
4: Te-Sb… 
5:  Sr 
6: Co-Mo 
7: La-Y 
8 
Ce - Pu 
9 
Ba 
1 9. 96 x 10-1 3. 50 x 10-5  0. 00 4.30 x 10-6 
2 8. 50 x 10-1 8. 60 x 10-2  0. 00 9. 70 x 10-4 
3 9. 94 x 10-1 1. 80 x 10-2  4. 20 x 10-3 9. 90 x 10-2 
. 
. 
. 
     
14 9. 78 x 10-1 8. 40 x 10-2  1. 70 x 10-2 2.00 x 10-2 
15 9. 99 x 10-1 9. 46 x 10-1  1. 30 x 10-2 2. 25 x 10-1 
Table A.III. Sample of the release fractions of 9 radionuclide groups of the 60 
radionuclides for 15 release categories for Chinshan NPP. 
 
The results showed that the whole body dose of 2.0 Sv was the most critical 
dose criterion and hence should be selected for the conservative purpose. The 
resulted EPZ for the Chinshan NPP with respect to dose criteria was less than1.5 
km. Fig. A.3 shows the individual risk46 and societal risk for the plant. From the 
aspect of risk, the estimated EPZ for Chinshan NPP met the dose criteria 
requirements.  
Following these results, a decision was made that a radius of 5.0 km is still a 
conservative value for this operating NPP. 
                                                 
46
 By definition, the individual risk at a given radius from the plant is the ratio of acute fatality to 
total population within the diameter. 
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Fig. A.2. The probability of exceeding various doses versus distance from 
Chinshan NPP.  
                                      
Fig. A.3. The probability of exceeding individual/societal risks for Chinshan         
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APPENDIX  B 
Risk Informed Support of EP for Koeberg NPP in South Africa 
This section provides an overview of the risk insights to aid the derivation of the 
requirements for the Koeberg NPP emergency plan as applied in South Africa. 
The information has been taken and adapted from [10, 44], because it provides a 
very good and informative example of practical use of risk informed approach in 
support of NPP emergency zoning. 
The methodology used is based on using the Koeberg probabilistic risk 
assessment (PSA) results to the worst credible severe accident scenario, i. e. the 
reference accident. The off site consequences of this reference accident are 
assessed and compared to the criteria for protective actions as sheltering and 
evacuation. The approach used is a blend of deterministic and probabilistic 
approaches which conforms to international standards and can be used to 
optimise emergency planning. It is also a holistic approach that allows the NPP 
modifications that improve plant safety to be balanced against a reduction in the 
magnitude of the off-site emergency planning requirements. 
Koeberg NPP has two 922 MWe units. Each unit is a 3 loop Framatome (French 
version of Westinghouse PWR) unit and is located approx 35 km from Cape 
Town, a major city. With the growth in the local population, housing development 
is taking place nearer to the Koeberg NPP site. This development impacts on the 
ability to respond effectively in the event of a severe nuclear accident. In an effort 
to develop effective emergency plans, the utility implemented a program to derive 
the risks to the public and to use these risk insights to aid the optimisation of the 
emergency planning actions, zones and response times. In accordance with the 
current international practice, the Koeberg NPP has defined three zones 
surrounding the site: PAZ, UPZ, and FRPZ. The Koeberg emergency planning 
intervention levels meet national47 as well as international guidance48, 49 and are 
listed in Table B.I and B.II.  
The severe accidents that were derived for the EP reference accidents were 
obtained by using the iodine release as a measure of consequence, since iodine 
dominates the early public risks (Fig. B.1). It plots typical element contributions to 
whole body effective 7 day dose. Figure B.1 was derived for a specific accident 
scenario assuming a large early release of radioactivity and specified at a 
distance of 16 km from the site. However, the Koeberg risk assessment indicates 
that iodine dominates all risk significant accidents at all distances [10]. 
                                                 
47
 National Nuclear Regulator, The NNR Report on The Technical Basis For Emergency Planning 
At Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, South Africa, June 2000. 
48
 IAEA, Method for the Development of Emergency Response Preparedness for Nuclear or 
Radiological Accidents, IAEA-TECDOC-953, Vienna, 1997. See also the updating in [3]. 
49
 http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1133_scr.pdf 
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Protective Action Avertable dose Dose Integration Period 
Sheltering 5 to 50 mSv 2 days 
Evacuation 50 to 500 mSv 7 days 
Iodine prophylaxis 100 mGy Lifetime 
Temporary relocation Initiate at 30 mSv 
Terminate at 10 mSv 
30 days 
Permanent resettlement 1Sv Lifetime 
Table B.I. Koeberg NPP intervention levels for EP actions. 
 
Radionuclides in foods destined for consumption kBq/kg 
CS-134, CS-137, I-131, Ru-103, Ru-106, Sr-89 1 
Sr-90 0.1 
Am-241, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-242 0.01 
Radionuclides in milk, infant foods, and drinking water kBq/kg 
Cs-134, Cs-137, Ru-103, Ru-106, Sr-89 1 
I-131, Sr-90 0.1 
Am-241, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-242 0.001 
Table B.II. Koeberg NPP intervention levels for foodstuffs. 
A similar chart could be developed for a 50 year exposure which would then 
indicate that caesium dominates the overall consequences. It is therefore 
caesium that often determines the requirements for late phase emergency 
planning actions such as relocation and permanent resettlement [10].  
All the severe accidents from the plant risk assessment (L2 PSA) were then 
listed in order of their iodine release fraction with their associated accident 
frequencies. These severe accidents included those in a traditional PSA and 
those initiated during plant shutdown, initiated by external events (floods and 
even terrorism), and also those associated with the spent fuel pool. 
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Fig. B.1. Typical element contributions to whole body effective 7 day dose. 
In discussion with the regulatory body, it was decided that a cut-off of 10-6 per 
year can be used such that the cumulative frequency of the worst severe 
accident scenarios with a value of less than 10-6 per year can be deemed 
“incredible”. Thus, the worst credible severe accident scenario which must be 
planned for is the scenario, which has a cumulative frequency of 10-6 per year. 
This worst credible severe accident scenario became the reference accident for 
EP. Figure B.2 summarises the output of this assessment which is the plot of the 
cumulative frequency of severe accident sequences in order of their iodine 
release. Where the line crosses the cumulative frequency of 10-6 per year gives 
the maximum credible iodine release. Thus, the graph shows that the worst 
credible severe accident scenario leads to an iodine release of approximately 
0.85% of the core inventory. A 1% iodine release was then conservatively taken 
as the maximum credible release. This conservatism is appropriate given the 
shallow gradient of the curve over a wide range of iodine releases. The top left of 
the curve is linked to the total fuel melt frequency for the plant and the cumulative 
frequency of a 10% iodine release is associated with the Koeberg NPP estimated 
large early release frequency. 
Reference severe accident scenarios can be selected from the Fig. B.2. These 
scenarios have iodine release fractions (IRF) of approx 1E-1, 1E-2, and 1E-4 and 
are labelled “Likely” with given core damage (CD), “Credible” (maximum), and 
“Incredible”; details are shown in Table B.III. The severe accident scenarios from 
the plant PSA associated with these releases provide additional details such as 
time to release, duration of the release, height and energy of release, and 
magnitude of the other associated fission products. The dominant isotope 
releases are given on the next page in Table B.IV [10]. 
Iodine 
60% 
Tellurium 
 
 
23% 
Other 
13% 
Caesium 
4% 
 116 
 
 
 
 Fig. B.2. Iodine release vs. cumulative frequency CF of severe accident sequences. 
 
PSA Label Description Representative 
approx IRF [%] 
Approx 
release 
duration [h] 
Frequency 
[1/year] 
RC1T3 Likely 
 (given CD) 
0.01 8 5x10-5 to 10-5 
RC2T1 (Maximum) 
Credible 
1.00 2 10-5 to 10-6 
RC3T1 Incredible 10 1 <10-6 
Table B.III. Koeberg NPP reference accidents. 
The off site consequences of the emergency planning reference accidents are 
then assessed in terms of public doses and ground contamination. This is then 
compared to the criteria given in Table B.I and B.II to determine the distance 
from the site that each EP protective action may be required in the maximum 
credible severe accident scenario, which then leads to the deviation of the EP 
zone radii. The emphasis is placed on the worst credible release which equates 
to 1% of the total iodine inventory with the other radionuclides as determined by 
the severe accident analyses. The use of the other reference accidents, i. e. 
“Likely” (given core damage) and “Incredible” serve only to aid sensitivity 
analyses. 
The timing of the release in the credible reference accident and its duration is 
also used to aid the deviation of the time available for the implementation of 
some emergency planning protective actions as sheltering and evacuation. 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
E-07 
E-06 
E-05 
E-04 
E-05 E-04 E-03 E-02 E-01 E+00 
 
        Fraction of iodine inventory released to environment 
 
 below 1E-6 is  
“incredible” 
 
 
ST1 ST3
 
ST2
Incredible 
Likely 
Credible 
         CF 
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For comparison, some considerations are possible concerning basic classes of 
source term in France, which are given in Table 2.2 in section 5.2 of this report. 
That is why the ST1, ST2, ST3 source terms are also plotted in Figure B.2. 
Therefore, the comparison should be between the Koeberg NPP credible source 
term and ST3 source term as practised in France.  
 
PSA Label » » » »  RC1T3 RC2T1 RC3T1 
Containment 
failure mode »»»» 
No containment 
failure 
Small release Large early release 
Description»»»» Likely (given CD) (Maximum) 
Credible 
Incredible 
I-131 2.32 x 1014 2.71 x 1016 2.47 x 1017 
I-132 3.40 x 1014 3.99 x 1016 3.64 x 1017 
I-133 4.89 x 1014 5.72 x 1016 5.22 x 1017 
Te-132 3.53 x 1014 4.20 x 1016 3.08 x 1017 
Nb-95 8.14 x 1013 2.01 x 1016 2.99 x 1016 
Ru-103 6.47 x 1013 1.60 x 1016 2.38 x 1016 
Ru-106 1.94 x 1013 4.79 x 1015 7.14 x 1015 
Cs-134 3.78 x 1013 4.33 x 1015 4.02 x 1016 
Cs-137 2.81 x 1013 3.22 x 1015 2.98 x 1016 
Ba-140 4.25 x 1013 5.82 x 1015 3.77 x 1016 
Table B.IV. Reference accident dominant isotope releases [Bq]. 
As results from the Figure B.2, only ST3 source term is used in off-site 
consequence assessments, such as the requirements of emergency planning.  
Two computer codes were used to aid the assessment of the off-site 
consequences of the reference accidents. These were PC Cosyma50 and 
Hotspot51. The further text focuses only on some results, obtained by Cosyma 
(Code SYstem from MAria), which is a software package for assessing the offsite 
consequences of accidental releases of radioactive material to the atmosphere. It 
was developed as a part of the European Communities program Methods for 
                                                 
50
 PC COSYMA National Radiological Protection Board, Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, EUR 
16240 EN (NRPB - SR280). 
51
 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Hotspot Version 2.05, 2003. 
[http://www.llnl.gov/nhi/hotspot/]. 
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Assessing the Radiological Impact of Accidents (MARIA). 
The doses were calculated with the assumption that the core contains the 
specified fuel assemblies with an enrichment of 5,0% U-235. As is customary, it 
has been assumed that the core is a three-cycle core and the accident occurs at 
end-of-life conditions. Thus, the reactor is assumed to have been operated for an 
extended period at steady full power conditions. During this time it is assumed 
that the fuel has been changed in accordance with normal refuelling procedures 
in which case the oldest third of the fuel is replaced at each of the previous 
refuelling outages. 
Only the active zone has been considered. The other zones (gas plenums, 
bottom and top nozzles of the fuel assemblies) do not significantly contribute to 
the overall source terms and so have been ignored. 
PC Cosyma allows a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 72 sectors. The number of 
distance bands allowed is 2 to 25. For these calculations, the radial grid 
comprises 21 distance bands and 72 sectors at 5 degree intervals (Figure B.3). 
The distances are up to 80 km around Koeberg NPP site [44]. The code 
calculates the dose at the centre of each distance band in the direction of 
interest. 
The site boundary at Koeberg NPP extends from 1.3 km to 2.5 km from the site. 
It was agreed that the site boundary be taken as 1.5 km. The PAZ extends from 
2 to 5 km from site whereas the UPZ extends from 5 to 16 km from site. The 
distance bands are chosen in such a way that the mid-point of the distance 
bands coincides with these boundaries. 
Table B.V gives the 7-day effective whole body dose for the maximum credible 
radioactive release. The red cells mark where the doses exceed the upper level 
of evacuation (500 mSv) and the yellow cells mark where the doses exceed the 
lower level of evacuation (50 mSv), but they are lower than the upper intervention 
level for evacuation. The 7-day effective dose is an over-estimate of the 
avertable dose. This is because evacuation is based on environmental 
monitoring once the plume has passed. This means that the cloudshine and 
inhaled dose (committed dose) cannot be averted and only the groundshine (and 
any associated resuspension) can be averted. The 7-day effective dose is also 
the guideline used in the national nuclear regulator (NNR) EP technical bases.52 
In comparison, EDF uses a dose integration time of 1 day instead of 7 days and 
so their off-site consequence assessments of their ST3 source term are generally 
at least a factor of 7 less than the results given in Table B.V. 
 
 
                                                 
52
 The NNR Report on The Technical Basis For Emergency Planning At Koeberg Nuclear Power 
Station, National Nuclear Regulator, June 2000. 
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Figure B.3. Radial representation. 
As far as weather data is concerned, weather category D was used with a site-
specific wind speed of 3.8 m/s, which complies with Koeberg specific 
meteorological data. Within a sensitivity study, weather category F was 
considered. Weather Category F is more stable than D and so the area 
contaminated is longer but also narrower, leading to a similar overall area for 
evacuation. Changes in wind direction would have the effect of spreading a lower 
dose over a wider area such that the area exceeding 50 mSv would be reduced. 
Thus, changes in wind direction would reduce the area requiring evacuation. 
Rain was not considered in the calculations. 
The PC Cosyma calculations indicate that using a 5-degree angle for estimating 
the area to be evacuated in the UPZ would be sufficient. 
 
Table B.V. Credible accident 7-day whole body effective dose [mSv]. 
To determine the impact on plume width and area to be evacuated, sensitivity 
Distance (km) -20° -15° -10° -5° 0° 5° 10° 15° 20° 
0,5 84 561 2146 4765 6215 4765 2146 561 84 
1,2 5 61 400 1275 1881 1275 400 61 5 
1,5 2 33 249 890 1362 890 249 33 2 
1,7 1 23 190 725 1134 725 190 23 1 
2,0 1 14 132 554 895 554 132 14 1 
3,1 0 4 47 263 466 263 47 4 0 
5,0 0 1 14 113 227 113 14 1 0 
6,5 0 0 7 70 152 70 7 0 0 
7,5 0 0 4 54 122 54 4 0 0 
8,5 0 0 3 43 101 43 3 0 0 
9,5 0 0 2 35 85 35 2 0 0 
10,5 0 0 2 29 73 29 2 0 0 
11,5 0 0 1 24 64 24 1 0 0 
12,5 0 0 1 21 56 21 1 0 0 
13,5 0 0 1 18 50 18 1 0 0 
14,5 0 0 1 16 47 16 1 0 0 
16,0 0 0 0 14 43 14 0 0 0 
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analysis the off-site consequences of the likely release (given core damage) and 
the incredible release were also conducted. The sensitivity analysis resulted in 
no significant dose received off-site in the event of the most probable core 
damage scenario [44]. 
Table B.VI provides the criteria for determining the inner EPZ, i.e. PAZ and outer 
EPZ, i. e UPZ radii. This is based on the criteria specified in the above Table B.I 
and the national nuclear regulatory body technical assessment53. 
 
Table B.VI. PAZ and UPZ Dose Criteria. 
Table B.VI essentially states that the PAZ radius is obtained by determining 
where the EP reference accident with worst case weather gives a dose of 500 
mSv in 1 day. The PAZ radius upper bound is obtained using the same accident 
but assuming a 7-day exposure of 500 mSv. The lower bound would be obtained 
assuming average weather conditions and a 7 day exposure of 500 mSv. 
The same table essentially states that the UPZ radius is obtained by determining 
where the EP reference accident with average weather gives a dose of 50 mSv 
in 7 days. The UPZ radius upper bound is obtained using the same accident but 
assuming worst-case weather and a 1-day exposure of 50 mSv. The lower bound 
would be obtained assuming average weather conditions and a 1 day exposure 
of 50 mSv. 
Table B.VII presents the off-site consequence results for a range of severe 
accident releases for 3.9% enriched fuel with the plant specified average 
assembly burn-up. Thus, for a severe accident which releases 1.0% of the iodine 
(an iodine release fraction of 1.00E-2, see the above Fig. B.2), a PAZ of 3 km 
and a UPZ of 14 km would be appropriate.  
 
                                                 
53
 See footnotes 47 - 49 
* Best estimate is the point estimate of a parameter that is not biased by conservatism or 
optimism. Generally, the best estimate of a parameter is represented as a mean value [28]. 
Weather D          
Covers 
75% 
  Weather F                  
Covers 
100% 
Weather D          
Covers 
75% 
Weather F                   
Covers 
100% 
Weather D          
Covers 
75% 
 
Weather F                   
Covers 
 75% 
Weather D          
Covers 
75% 
Weather F                   
Covers 
100% 
UPZ 
Lower 
Bound 
UPZ 
Upper 
Bound 
UPZ Best 
Estimate*
UPZ 
Extreme 
Upper 
Bound 
PAZ 
Extreme 
Lower 
Bound 
PAZ Best 
Estimate*
     PAZ  
Lower 
Bound 
PAZ 
Upper 
Bound 
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Table B.VII. Off-site consequence results for a range of severe accident 
releases. 
To conclude, as it results from the presented example, emergency planning 
requirements can be enhanced by transition towards a more risk informed 
approach where the requirements take into account information supplied from the 
NPP PSA via the derivation of risk informed reference accidents. Although three 
reference accidents were developed, the focus was on the worst credible 
accident. The off-site consequences of the worst credible accident indicate that 
the off-site emergency plans presented in the following Table B.VIII are 
appropriate.  
As stated in [10], the analysis also indicated that no planning for permanent 
resettlement is warranted. The planning for temporary relocation is only required 
out to a distance of 6 km for a maximum of 2 months even though the 
environmental monitoring will need to extend to 80 km since it is possible that 
there could be small localised areas of high contamination. Food restrictions only 
need to be planned for the long term protective zone FRPZ (80 km) but with the 
explicit understanding that actual measures may need to be expanded beyond 
this planning zone.  
Finally, the choice of weather stability category has little impact on the results. 
Weather stability category F is more stable than D and so the area contaminated 
is longer, but also narrower leading to a similar overall area for EP actions. 
In addition, in [10] there is also some information on evacuation traffic modelling, 
as it is important in determining the credibility of implementing effective 
evacuation. The model used the predicted housing and road developments to 
estimate the time required for evacuation. The modelling took into account the 
income category of the developments, the amount of public transport that would 
be required, as well as the traffic flow rate. The estimated population growth near 
Koeberg is expected to grow from ~ 95000 in 2005 by a factor of 4 over the next 
25 years, to reach ~ 380000 in 2030. 
 
Weather D          
Covers 
75% 
Weather F                   
Covers 
100% 
Weather D          
Covers 
75% 
Weather F                   
Covers 
100% 
Weather D 
Covers 
75% 
Weather F                   
Covers 
100% 
Weather D          
Covers 
75% 
Weather F                   
Covers 
100% 
UPZ 
Lower 
Bound 
UPZ 
Upper 
Bound 
 UPZ 
 Best 
Estimate 
UPZ 
Extreme 
Upper 
Bound 
PAZ 
Extreme 
Lower 
Bound 
PAZ 
 Best 
Estimate 
PAZ 
Lower 
Bound 
PAZ 
Upper 
Bound 
1,00E-01 14 km >25 km >25 km >25 km 3 km 7 km 7 km >25 km
1,00E-02 7 km >25 km 14 km >25 km <2 km 3 km 3 km 7 km
1,00E-03 4 km 9 km 7 km >25 km <2 km <2 km <2 km 3 km
1,00E-04 <2 km <2 km <2 km <2 km <2 km <2 km <2 km <2 km 
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CONSEQUENCES: 50 mSv and 500 mSv Doses at Distance X (km)
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ZONE SIZE [km] ACTION IMPLEMENTATION TIME [h] 
PAZ 0 - 5 Evacuation (all sectors) based on 
 in-plant conditions 
   454 
 
 
UPZ 
 
 
5 - 16 
Shelter (downwind sectors) 
Evacuation based on in-plant 
condition leading to 12-16 hour 
advance warning  
Thyroid blocking (downwind 
sectors) 
    454 
16 
 
   1054 
 
FRPZ 
 
0 - 80 
Relocation (based on 
environmental monitoring) 
Food ban (based on environmental 
monitoring) 
Long-term 
action 
Long-term 
action 
Table B.VIII. Koeberg NPP emergency plan requirements. 
The estimated evacuation time in 2010 is ~ 9 hours, and in 2030 ~ 11 hours, 
respectively. The results of modelling indicate, that the time to evacuate remains 
below 12 hours for the life of the plant. The overall evacuation modelling process 
is still being refined. 
 
                                                 
54
 The implementation time from declaration of a general emergency i.e. the time required for 
public (e.g. siren) notification system 
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APPENDIX  C 
PSA Support of EPZ for Temelin NPP in Czech Republic 
This section provides a summary of severe accident analyses and the use of 
their relevant results for emergency zoning practices as applied in Czech 
Republic for Temelin NPP. The information has been taken and adapted 
from55,56 [45, 46], and it provides another good and very informative example of 
practical use of risk informed approach in support of NPP emergency zoning. 
The above referred materials were developed in “Temelin case”, aiming at 
achieving more concerted approach between Czech and Austrian party towards 
the emergency planning and response to a radiological accident, which could 
have – with very low probability – trans-boundary impact. It provides in a 
comprehensive way the description of background and approach applied in 
Czech Republic for emergency preparedness and planning in general. 
The Temelin NPP (two PWR units, each of 1000MWe of WWER reactor type) is 
located about 25 kilometres north of Ceske Budejovice, the regional capital of 
South Bohemia and 5 kilometres south of the small town of Tyn nad Vltavou. The 
site is approximately 55 km from the Czech-Austrian border. During the licensing 
process of the Temelin NPP, Czech nuclear regulatory authority kept in mind and 
carried out - together with other aspects of nuclear safety and radiological 
protection - also assessments of radiological consequences of both DBAs as well 
as BDBAs and severe accidents, which normally are not covered by the NPP 
Safety Analysis Report and other licensing documentation. For the EPZ size 
determination, as the worst case approximation of first two hypothetical 
sequences with maximal consequences were analysed, both of occurrence 
frequency of the order of 10-10/year. 
Further step took into consideration more realistic scenarios and their radiological 
consequences. According to the Czech national regulation57, the licensee shall 
provide for the regulatory authority’s decision a list of possible radiological 
accidents for the particular nuclear facility of the occurrence frequency higher or 
equal of 10-7/year with evaluation of their consequences. These scenarios were 
selected on the basis of L1 and L2 PSA results. The requirements of the above 
mentioned national regulation resulted in analyses of the radiological 
consequences for scenarios of occurrence frequency of one order lower than 
accepted in international practice based on for example [15, 16], Table 5.1, 
Chapter 5. 
According to the Czech legislation there is no advance planning of response and 
countermeasures for consequences of events of the probability of occurrence 
lower than 10-7 per reactor year. Nevertheless, like in various countries within EU 
and beyond, there is the general emergency response system established, which 
                                                 
55
 http://www.mzv.cz/EIA/eia/severe2.pdf 
56http://www.umweltbundesamt.at/fileadmin/site/umweltthemen/kernenergie/temelin/Melk/Gesamt
UVP/UVPBericht/Teil5.pdf 
57
 Government Ordinance No. 11/1999 
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has to be able to cope with even less likely disasters with more severe 
consequences ad hoc depending on the extent, development and actual and 
predicted consequences. The basic technical and organisational tools for such 
hypothetical cases are the nation-wide radiation monitoring network and off-site 
national emergency response plan on the level of the region and the whole 
country. 
The selection of severe accident scenarios meeting the frequency of occurrence 
higher or equal to the value of 10-7/year given in the national regulation for the 
Temelin NPP was based on the following criteria: 
 
• Sequences with the highest frequency, i.e. with the highest probability of 
occurrence; 
• Sequences with the highest significance, i.e. with the highest source term 
related to the frequency. 
Application of this approach resulted in two main events/associated sequences, 
which would contribute to the considerable radiological consequences, both of 
the highest frequency and the highest significance criteria: 1) major leak from 
primary to secondary circuit, and 2) large LOCA. 
The first sequence is defined as a major leak from primary to secondary circuit 
when the operator fails to cool down and depressurize the primary circuit. 
Damage of the core and significant release of radionuclides will occur after the 
loss of inventory to cool the core. 
The second sequence is defined as large LOCA with the failure of low pressure 
injection (LPI) system of emergency core cooling system (ECCS). Other 
emergency systems remain available. Due to insufficient capacity of these 
systems, there is a severe damage to the core with subsequent damage to 
reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Since the spray system is in operation, the 
containment is not challenged due to overpressure. 
Many variations and sensitivity cases of both above specified scenarios were 
analyzed by MELCOR code, aiming at studying various phenomena influencing 
the containment behaviour during the severe accident progression. To mention 
the first of them, major leak from primary to secondary circuit was combined with 
simultaneous complete loss of alternating current (AC) electric power (in further 
text mentioned as scenario “V” and source term “STV”) with frequency of 10-
10/year. The second one is the simultaneous occurrence of large LOCA with 
complete loss of AC electric power (frequency of 10-10/year), which is further 
mentioned as various ”AB” scenarios. The most relevant scenarios were as 
follows:  
1. Large leaks from primary to secondary circuit with containment bypass 
without any operator action58 with and without thermal creep of the hot leg 
                                                 
58
 Due to operator failure to intervene, leading to core degradation containment bypass occurs. In 
terms of the NPP personnel  training, plant human factor philosophy, instrumentation and control 
devices available to operators, operating/contingency planning procedures, etc. is more than 
evident this assumption is entirely unrealistic. 
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piping. Thermal creep of the hot leg as one case, and high pressure scenario 
of primary circuit hermetically tight and direct containment heating after RPV 
bottom failure as another case were analysed. For both cases time course of 
the radionuclides releasing from the containment, i. e. the source terms were 
estimated. In further text they are mentioned as ST1.1 and ST1.2.  
2. Large LOCA on the pressurizer surge line with simultaneous unavailability of 
ECCS. Calculated source term (ST2) corresponds with the scenario leading 
to severe core damage. Within this, spray system in operation was modelled, 
enabling to analyse also the effects related to hydrogen issue. Hydrogen 
deflagration in containment during the severe accident progression and 
molten core concrete interaction after the RPV bottom failure with corium pool 
surface of approx 100m2 were analysed59.  
3. Containment integrity challenge after hydrogen detonation during LOCA with 
simultaneous unavailability of ECCS. The same initiating event and 
assumptions as in 2, but the function of catalytic recombiners and hydrogen 
deflagration was not considered. Two source terms ST3.1 and ST3.2 
correspond with analysed cases, both considering breach of the containment 
integrity after hydrogen detonation. However, the hydrogen detonation can 
easily be excluded by rigorous adherence to severe accident management 
measures (SAMG). Only complete failure of operating staff could lead to 
conditions enabling the hydrogen detonation in the containment60.  
4. Station blackout with permanent loss of all active safety systems. Following 
phenomena were studied in this case: containment slow overpressure due to 
loss of heat sink, direct containment heating after the failure of the RPV 
bottom, molten core concrete interaction in the cavity and in vertical neutron 
measurement channels with the corium pool surface of approx 25 m2. Source 
term ST4 corresponds with this analysed case. 
5. Large LOCA on pressurizer surge line with equivalent diameter of 200 mm 
with ECCS reinitiated after RPV failure. The progress of molten core concrete 
interaction when the water layer covers the corium pool was studied in this 
case61. The analysis results in source term ST5. 
The analysed beyond design basis and severe accidents scenarios, i.e. the 
above “AB” and “V” sequences as well as other sequences meeting probabilistic 
criterion specified in the national regulation (the frequency of occurrence for the 
particular nuclear facility higher or equal 10-7/year) would lead to exceeding of 
selected dose levels - intervention levels - at distances summarised in Tab. C.I. 
                                                 
59
 See footnote 58 
60
 See footnote 58 
61
 The event was analysed in principle only for confirmation of possibility to stop the molten core 
penetration through concrete of the containment basement plate by flooding the melt in the late 
phase of severe accident progression. 
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Sequence/ 
Source term 
Intervention 
level for ≤2 days 
SHELTERING 
10 mSv62 
[km] 
Intervention 
level for ≤2 days 
SHELTERING 
50 mSv63 
[km] 
Intervention 
level for ≤7 days 
EVACUATION 
50 mSv64 
[km] 
Intervention 
level for ≤7 days 
EVACUATION 
500 mSv65 
[km] 
AB_01 5 <1 1 <1 
AB_02 8 2 2 <1 
AB_03 11 3 4 <1 
AB_04 9 1 2 <1 
STV 40 <1 <1 <1 
ST1.1 23 2 3 2 
ST1.2 17 5 5 2 
ST2 <1 <1 <1 <1 
ST3.1 19 2 2 <1 
ST3.2 14 2 3 <1 
ST4 <1 <1 <1 <1 
ST5 2 <1 <1 <1 
Table C.I. Most relevant results of radiological consequence calculations for 
selected accidents. 
As the worst case, conservative assumption of weather category F (virtually 
without any dispersion) was used for the dispersion model. 
                                                 
62
 The generic optimized intervention level for sheltering is 10 mSv of avertable dose in a period 
of no more than 2 days [http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/SS-115-
Web/Pub996_web-5.pdf] 
63
 International Commission on Radiological Protection, Principles for Intervention for Protection 
of the Public in a Radiological Emergency, ICRP Publication No. 63:, Pergamon Press, Oxford,  
1992 
64
 The generic optimized intervention value for temporary evacuation is 50 mSv of avertable dose 
in a period of no more than 1 week; in: as in footnote 62. 
65
 See footnote 63 
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Fig. C.1. Effective dose-distance courses for the worst case of conservative 
assumption of weather category F.  
 
Results in Tab. C.I are relevant for urgent (short term) countermeasures, i. e. 
sheltering (2 days), iodine prophylaxis, and evacuation (7 days). The 
countermeasures do not have to be introduced at distances at which the doses 
do not exceed upper bounds of intervention levels interval, i.e. at distances 
where the dose is lower than 50 mSv for sheltering and iodine prophylaxis (ICRP 
recommendations [17]) and lower than 500 mSv for evacuation, according to the 
same recommendations. For all urgent countermeasures the upper bound of 
intervention levels interval is not exceeded at distances greater than 5 km from 
the plant.  
The course of effective dose in 7 days along the distance from the plant for the 
most important sequences is as illustrated in Fig. C.1. As the worst case, 
conservative assumption of weather category F (virtually without any dispersion) 
was used again for the dispersion model. What results from the figure is, that for 
the distances from the plant longer than 35 km the dose is lower than 5 mSv 
except for V sequence, having, however, the frequency 10-10  per year. 
To conclude the above considerations it should be mentioned, that the shortest 
distance from Temelin NPP to the border between Czech Republic and Austria is 
approx 50 km. 
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